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Abstract
In this thesis, a special representation of numbers called continued fraction is studied.
The continued fraction has a rich history and it is one of the most striking and
powerful representations of numbers. For irrational numbers, a continued fraction
expansion often reveals beautiful number patterns which remain obscured in their
decimal expansion.
For the first part of this thesis, we prove some old and new continued fraction
identities. Most of the proofs here are direct and elementary, where we use the
Euler-Wallis recursive formula to derive closed form formulas for the convergents of
particular continued fractions. A major part of the thesis is devoted to the study
of the harmonic continued fraction and we determine the explicit convergence value
for the even case of the harmonic continued fraction.
In the second part of the thesis, we show how to use continued fractions to
develop efficient algorithms that can break public-key cryptosystems. Public-key
cryptosystems are the backbone of Internet secure communication. We show that in
the RSA cryptosystem and three other RSA-variant systems, if the keys are smaller
than a certain bound, then it is possible to use continued fractions to determine the
secret key from the public information.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Research aims
In this thesis, a special representation of numbers called “continued fraction” is
studied. A continued fraction is an expression of the form
a0 +
b0
a1 +
b1
a2 +
b2
. . .
The continued fraction has a rich history and it is one of the most striking and
powerful representations of numbers. Sometimes, numbers whose decimal expan-
sions look totally random are revealed to have beautiful symmetries and patterns
embedded deep within them when unfolded into a continued fraction.
Below are some beautiful continued fraction representations of the constant π:
π =
4
1 +
12
2 +
32
2 +
52
2 +
72
. . .
=
4
1 +
12
3 +
22
5 +
32
7 +
42
. . .
= 3 +
12
6 +
32
6 +
52
6 +
72
6 +
92
. . .
1
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= 2+
2
1
1
+
1
1
2
+
1
1
3
+
1
1
4
+
1
. . .
= 2+
2
1 +
1× 2
1 +
2× 3
1 +
3× 4
1 +
4× 5
. . .
= 2+
4
3 +
1× 3
4 +
3× 5
4 +
5× 7
4 +
7× 9
. . .
This research has the following two main goals.
1. To study classical results and develop further the theory of continued fractions.
There are numerous beautiful continued fractions developed by Euler, La-
grange, Gauss, Stieltjes, Ramanujan, . . . using various methods. This research
looks for alternative techniques which can be used to establish some of these
classical results. For instance, we want to know if it is possible to find closed
form formula for some of these continued fractions’ convergents, or if it is
possible to generalise some of these continued fractions.
2. To find new applications of continued fractions.
Continued fractions have many applications. They are used in analysing Frieze
patterns [17], in Rødseth’s formula for Frobenius numbers [44], in computing
the Jacobi symbol [2], in stream ciphers [24], in pseudo-random number gen-
erators [4], in cryptanalysis of the RSA public-key cryptosystem with small
private exponents [5], [46]. This research looks for new applications of contin-
ued fractions in Computer Science.
1.2 Contributions and structure of thesis
In section 1.4, we review some fundamental results in the theory of continued frac-
tions. These results are not new and can be found in most textbooks on number
theory such as [6], [7], [21], [23], [25], [33].
Chapter 2 is based on the paper [41]. In this chapter, we present a proof of the
following well-known continued fraction of e1/M due to Euler, that for any positive
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real number M :
e1/M = 1 +
1
M − 1 +
1
1 +
1
1 +
1
3M − 1 +
1
1 +
1
1 +
1
5M − 1 +
1
. . .
Our proof is based on the following new continued fraction of e1/M :
e1/M = 1 +
1
M − 1
2
+
1
4
3M +
1
4
5M +
1
4
7M +
1
4
. . .
Chapter 3 is based on the paper [43]. In this chapter, we present a new proof by
contradiction of the following two continued fractions of the Euler’s constant e:
e = 2 +
1
1 +
1
2 +
2
3 +
3
. . .
= 2 +
2
2 +
3
3 +
4
4 +
5
. . .
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As a by-product, we obtain the following two new continued fractions
n+
n
n+ 1 +
n+ 1
n+ 2 +
n+ 2
n+ 3 +
n+ 3
. . .
= − n
n+ 1
×
e
n∑
k=0
(−1)k
k!
− 1
e
n+1∑
k=0
(−1)k
k!
− 1
,
and
n+
n+ 1
n+ 1 +
n+ 2
n+ 2 +
n+ 3
. . .
= −
e
n−1∑
k=0
(−1)k
k!
− 1
e
n∑
k=0
(−1)k
k!
− 1
.
Chapter 4 is based on the paper [42]. In this chapter, we prove the following new
continued fractions
a+ 1−
1(a+ 1)
a+ 3−
2(a+ 2)
a+ 5−
3(a+ 3)
. . . a+ 2n− 1−
n(a+ n)
a+ 2n+ 1
=

1
∑n
k=0
1
k + 1
if a = 0
a
1−
(n+ 1)!
(a+ 1)(a+ 2) . . . (a+ n+ 1)
if a 6= 0
Chapter 1. Introduction 5
and
a+ 1−
1(a+ 1)
a+ 3−
2(a+ 2)
a+ 5−
3(a+ 3)
a+ 7−
4(a+ 4)
. . .
=

a if a ≥ 0
0 if a < 0 and a 6∈ Z
Chapter 5 is based on the paper [12]. In this chapter, we present a new proof of the
following two continued fractions
1
1
+
1
1
2
+
1
1
3
+
1
1
4
+
1
. . .
=
2
π − 2
and
2
1
+
1
2
2
+
1
2
3
+
1
2
4
+
1
. . .
=
1
2 ln 2− 1
.
As a by-product, we obtain the following new continued fractions
1
1
+
1
1
2
+
1
1
3
+
1
. . . +
1
1
2n− 1
=
1
1
2n
2242 . . . (2n)2
1232 . . . (2n− 1)2
− 1
,
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1
1
+
1
1
2
+
1
1
3
+
1
. . . +
1
1
2n
=
1
1
2n+ 1
2242 . . . (2n)2
1232 . . . (2n− 1)2
− 1
,
2
1
+
1
2
2
+
1
2
3
+
1
. . . +
1
2
n
=
1
n−1∑
i=0
(−1)i
(i+ 1)(i+ 2)
.
Chapter 6 is based on the paper [8] which is currently submitted for publication. In
this chapter, we consider the harmonic continued fraction
HCF (t) =
t
1
+
1
t
2
+
1
t
3
+
1
. . .
,
for a general value of t ∈ R+.
We derive explicit formulas for the numerator and the denominator of the conver-
gents. In particular, when t = 2a is an even positive integer, we can determine the
exact value of HCF (t):
HCF (2a) =
(−1)a−1
2a ln 2− 1− 2a
(
1−
1
2
+
1
3
−
1
4
+ · · · −
1
2ba
2
c
).
In order to establish this result, we define and study the following convolution al-
ternating power sums
Ti,j(n) =
n∑
k=0
(−1)kki(n− k)j
and prove some identities involving Euler polynomials and Stirling numbers, which
are of independent interest.
The last two chapters are devoted to the application of continued fractions in cryp-
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tography. We show how to use continued fractions to develop efficient algorithms
that can break public-key cryptosystems. In a public-key cryptosystem, the encryp-
tion key and decryption key are different: the first one is made public and shared
with everyone, whereas the latter one must be kept secret. Anyone can use the
public key to encrypt a plaintext into a scrambled ciphertext but only the owner
of the private key can decrypt the ciphertext back to the plaintext. Public-key
cryptosystems are the backbone of Internet secure communication.
The public key and the private key are mathematically linked and it should be
computationally impossible for anyone to determine the private key from the public
key. This means that the system needs to be based on some hard computational
maths problem. The RSA cryptosystem is based on the hardness of factorization of
big numbers. To generate an RSA key, one would select two large prime numbers p
and q, and multiply them to get a huge number N = pq. Next, choose two numbers
1 < e, d < (p− 1)(q − 1) such that ed = 1 (mod (p− 1)(q − 1)). The public key is
(N, e) and the private key is (p, q, d). A plaintext 1 < m < N is encrypted as c = me
(mod N) and the ciphertext c is decrypted as m = cd (mod N). The decryption
and encryption cancel out each other thanks to Euler’s theorem:
m(p−1)(q−1) = 1 (mod N).
The security of RSA system is based on the hardness of factorization of big numbers.
Given a huge modulus N in the public key, say 21000, there is no efficient algorithm
currently available to factor N to find out the two primes p and q. Thus, everyone
knows N but no one knows φ(N) = (p − 1)(q − 1) except the owner of the key.
So from the public information (N, e), it would be computationally impossible for
anyone to determine the secret value d = e−1 (mod φ(N)).
We show that in the RSA cryptosystem and three other RSA-variant systems, if the
keys are smaller than a certain bound then it is possible to use continued fractions
to determine the secret key from the public information.
Chapter 7 is an extension of the papers [10], [11]. In this chapter, we will present an
attack on the RSA cryptosystem. We show that, for an arbitrary parameter t ∈ Z+,
if the public key (N, e) and the private key (p, q, d) satisfy
d2e < 8tN
3
2 ,
then it is possible to efficiently perform the RSA number factorization and determine
the private key using continued fractions, and the running time of our algorithm is
O(t logN).
Chapter 1. Introduction 8
Our new attack is verified by an experiment with a 1024-bit modulus N and a 301-
bit secret exponent d, which is out of reach for the previous attacks by Wiener [46]
and Boneh et al [5].
Chapter 8 is an extension of the paper [9]. In this chapter, we apply the continued
fraction method to launch a new attack on the three RSA-variant cryptosystems:
• The Kuwakado-Koyama-Tsuruoka scheme [28]: a scheme based on singular
cubic curves y2 = x3 + bx2 (mod N) where N = pq is an RSA modulus.
• The Elkamchouchi-Elshenawy-Shaban scheme [18]: an extension of the RSA
scheme over the domain of Gaussian integers.
• The Castagnos scheme [13]: a public-key cryptosystem based on certain Lucas
sequences.
We show that, for an arbitrary parameter t ∈ Z+, if the public key (N, e) and the
private key (p, q, d) satisfy
d2e < 2t
(N2 − 5
2
N)2
N + 4t
≈ 2tN3,
then there is an algorithm with running time O(t logN) that can determine the
private key from the public key. Our new attack is verified by an experiment with
a 1024-bit modulus N , a 2029-bit public key e and a 520-bit private key d.
1.3 Future work
A major work in the first part of this thesis is to investigate the harmonic continued
fraction HCF (t). In chapter 5, we give a simple and direct proof of closed form
formulas for HCF (1) and HCF (2). In chapter 6, we give a closed form formula
for the even case, HCF (2a) for all positive integer a. It is our future work to
determine a closed form formula for the odd case, HCF (2a + 1), and the general
case, HCF (t), for all positive real number t. It is also our future work to look at
the rate of convergence of these continued fractions as the value of t varies.
The second part of the thesis looks at the applications of continued fractions in
cryptography, particularly in public key encryption algorithms, RSA and variants
of RSA. It is our future work to look at other applications in cryptography, such as
pseudo-random generator and stream ciphers.
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1.4 Preliminaries
In this section, we review some fundamental results in the theory of continued
fractions. These results are not new and can be found in most textbooks on number
theory such as [6], [7], [21], [23], [25], [33].
1.4.1 The convergents of a continued fraction
Throughout this thesis, we will use the following notations
[a0, (b0, a1), (b1, a2), . . . ] = a0 +
b0
a1 +
b1
a2 +
b2
. . .
,
[a0, (b0, a1), . . . , (bn−1, an)] = a0 +
b0
a1 +
b1
. . . an−1 +
bn−1
an
.
The truncated continued fraction [a0, (b0, a1), . . . , (bn−1, an)] is called the n
th
convergent of the longer continued fraction [a0, (b0, a1), . . . , (bn−1, an), . . . ]
An ordinary continued fraction is a continued fraction with all the bi coefficients
equal to 1. We will use the following shorter notations to denote ordinary continued
fractions:
[a0, a1, a2, . . . ] = a0 +
1
a1 +
1
a2 +
1
. . .
,
[a0, a1, . . . , an] = a0 +
1
a1 +
1
. . . +
1
an
.
In this case, the truncated continued fraction [a0, a1, . . . , an] is the n
th convergent of
the longer continued fraction [a0, a1, a2, . . . ].
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The value of a finite continued fraction is clearly determined. The value of an infinite
continued fraction is defined in a natural way:
a0 +
b0
a1 +
b1
a2 +
b2
. . .
= lim
n→∞
[a0, (b0, a1), . . . , (bn−1, an)].
If this limit exists then we say that the infinite continued fraction converges.
1.4.2 The Euler-Wallis recursive formula
To prove that a continued fraction converges, we often need to determine its conver-
gent sequence. The following theorem due to William Brouncker (1620-1684), the
first President of the Royal Society, gives us recursive formulas to calculate the con-
vergents. John Wallis (1616-1703) and Leonhard Euler (1707-1783) made extensive
use of these formulas, which are now called the Euler-Wallis formulas.
Theorem 1.4.1 [45]. For any n ≥ 0, the nth convergent can be determined as
cn =
pn
qn
,
where the numerator and the denominator sequences {pn}n≥−2 and {qn}n≥−2 are
specified as follows (with the convention that b−1 = 1):
p−2 = 0, p−1 = 1, pn = anpn−1 + bn−1pn−2, ∀n ≥ 0,
q−2 = 1, q−1 = 0, qn = anqn−1 + bn−1qn−2, ∀n ≥ 0.
Proof. We prove this by induction. In the base case n = 0, we have p0 = a0 and
q0 = 1, so the formulas are correct. To prove the n + 1 case, modify the coefficient
an to be an +
bn
an+1
, the (n+ 1)th convergent is equal to the modified nth convergent,
and thus by the induction hypothesis,
pn+1
qn+1
=
(
an +
bn
an+1
)
pn−1 + bn−1pn−2(
an +
bn
an+1
)
qn−1 + bn−1qn−2
=
an+1(anpn−1 + bn−1pn−2) + bnpn−1
an+1(anqn−1 + bn−1qn−2) + bnqn−1
=
an+1pn + bnpn−1
an+1qn + bnqn−1
.
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This completes the proof. 
Note that the convergents start with c0 = p0/q0, but allowing the recursive formulas
to hold for n = 0 and n = 1, in Theorem 1.4.1, we extend the sequence index to
n = −1 and n = −2 and also make the convention that b−1 = 1.
Sometimes we want to investigate the sub-sequences {p2n}, {p2n−1}, {q2n}, {q2n−1}
and the following theorem is useful in those scenarios.
Theorem 1.4.2 The convergents pn
qn
satisfy the following:
pn =
(
anan−1 +
anbn−2
an−2
+ bn−1
)
pn−2 −
anbn−2bn−3
an−2
pn−4, ∀n ≥ 2,
qn =
(
anan−1 +
anbn−2
an−2
+ bn−1
)
qn−2 −
anbn−2bn−3
an−2
qn−4, ∀n ≥ 2.
Proof. By the Euler-Wallis formula,
pn−2 = an−2 pn−3 + bn−3 pn−4, ∀n ≥ 2,
so
pn−3 =
1
an−2
pn−2 −
bn−3
an−2
pn−4.
Using the Euler-Wallis formula again, we have
pn−1 = an−1 pn−2 + bn−2 pn−3
= an−1 pn−2 + bn−2
(
1
an−2
pn−2 −
bn−3
an−2
pn−4
)
=
(
an−1 +
bn−2
an−2
)
pn−2 −
bn−2 bn−3
an−2
pn−4.
Finally, applying the Euler-Wallis formula once more, we have
pn = an pn−1 + bn−1 pn−2
= an
((
an−1 +
bn−2
an−2
)
pn−2 −
bn−2 bn−3
an−2
pn−4
)
+ bn−1 pn−2
=
(
anan−1 +
anbn−2
an−2
+ bn−1
)
pn−2 −
anbn−2bn−3
an−2
pn−4.
The relation for qn is proved similarly. 
Using the Euler-Wallis recurrence formulas, it is easy to prove the following identities
for convergents.
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Theorem 1.4.3 [25] The convergents satisfy the following identities:
pnqn−1 − qnpn−1 = (−1)n−1
n−1∏
i=0
bi, ∀n ≥ −1, (1.1)
pnqn−2 − qnpn−2 = (−1)nan
n−2∏
i=0
bi, ∀n ≥ 0, (1.2)
with the convention that
∏−2
i=0 bi =
∏−1
i=0 bi = 1.
Proof. The identity (1.1) is true for n = −1 and n = 0 as p−1q−2 − q−1p−2 = 1 and
p0q−1 − q0p−1 = −1. For n ≥ 1, it follows from the following equation:
pnqn−1 − qnpn−1 = (anpn−1 + bn−1pn−2)qn−1 − (anqn−1 + bn−1qn−2)pn−1
= −bn−1(pn−1qn−2 − qn−1pn−2).
The identity (1.2) is a consequence of the following equation and (1.1):
pnqn−2 − qnpn−2 = (anpn−1 + bn−1pn−2)qn−2 − (anqn−1 + bn−1qn−2)pn−2
= an(pn−1qn−2 − qn−1pn−2), ∀n ≥ 0. 
The following theorem is a direct consequence of Theorem 1.4.3.
Theorem 1.4.4 The convergents of an ordinary continued fraction satisfy the fol-
lowing identities:
pnqn−1 − qnpn−1 = (−1)n−1, ∀n ≥ −1, (1.3)
pnqn−2 − qnpn−2 = (−1)nan, ∀n ≥ 0. (1.4)
1.4.3 Convergence of continued fractions with positive coefficients
Theorem 1.4.5 [25] If an > 0 for all n ≥ 1, bn > 0 for all n ≥ 0, and
lim
n→∞
b0b1 . . . b2n
q2nq2n+1
= 0
then the continued fraction converges.
Proof. By the Euler-Wallis recursive formula, qn > 0 for all n ≥ 0. From the
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identities of Theorem 1.4.3 we have
pn
qn
− pn−1
qn−1
=
(−1)n−1b0b1 . . . bn−1
qn−1qn
,
pn
qn
− pn−2
qn−2
=
(−1)nanb0b1 . . . bn−2
qn−2qn
.
It follows that,
p1
q1
>
p3
q3
>
p5
q5
> · · · > p2n+1
q2n+1
> · · · > p2n
q2n
> · · · > p4
q4
>
p2
q2
>
p0
q0
.
Thus, in this case the two sub-sequences {p2n
q2n
} and {p2n+1
q2n+1
} always converge, and the
continued fraction converges if and only if
lim
n→∞
(
p2n+1
q2n+1
− p2n
q2n
)
= lim
n→∞
b0b1 . . . b2n
q2nq2n+1
= 0. 
Theorem 1.4.6 [25] If an > 0 for all n ≥ 1, bn > 0 for all n ≥ 0, and
lim
n→∞
b0b1 . . . b2n
a21 . . . a
2
2n a2n+1
= 0.
then the continued fraction converges.
Proof. Since q0 = 1 and qn ≥ anqn−1, we have qn ≥ a1 . . . an for all n ≥ 1, and thus,
b0b1 . . . b2n
q2nq2n+1
≤ b0b1 . . . b2n
a21 . . . a
2
2n a2n+1
.
Therefore, by Theorem 1.4.5, the continued fraction converges if
lim
n→∞
b0b1 . . . b2n
a21 . . . a
2
2n a2n+1
= 0. 
Theorem 1.4.7 [25] If an ≥ 1 for all n ≥ 1, then the ordinary continued fraction
[a0, a1, a2, a3, . . . ] converges.
Proof. Since q0 = 1, q1 = a1 ≥ 1 and qn = anqn−1 + qn−2 ≥ qn−1 + qn−2 for all n ≥ 2,
qn tends to infinity. By Theorem 1.4.5, the continued fraction converges. 
Theorem 1.4.7 is a special case of a more general theorem due to Seidel and Stern [3],
[30], [38], [39], dating back to the 1840s:
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Theorem 1.4.8 (The Seidel-Stern Theorem) [25] If an > 0 for all n ≥ 1 then
the ordinary continued fraction [a0, a1, a2, a3, . . . ] converges if, and only if,
∑∞
n=0 an
diverges.
Proof. We have
q−1 = 0, q0 = 1, qn = anqn−1 + qn−2 > qn−2, ∀n ≥ 1,
so the sequences {q2n} and {q2n+1} are increasing and
qn ≥ min(q0, q1) > 0, ∀n ≥ 0.
We have
qn − qn−2 = anqn−1 ≥ min(q0, q1) an, ∀n ≥ 1.
Taking summation, we obtain
qn + qn−1 − q0 − q−1 ≥ min(q0, q1)
n∑
i=1
ai, ∀n ≥ 2,
and
qn + qn−1 ≥ q0 + q−1 + min(q0, q1)
n∑
i=1
ai.
Therefore, if the series
∑
i ai diverges then qn + qn−1 tends to infinity, and as
qnqn−1 ≥ qn min(q0, q1),
qnqn−1 ≥ qn−1 min(q0, q1),
2qnqn−1 ≥ (qn + qn−1) min(q0, q1),
it follows that qnqn−1 also tends to infinity, by Theorem 1.4.5, the continued fraction
converges.
Now suppose that
∑
k ak converges; we will show that the continued fraction di-
verges. By Theorem 1.4.5, it suffices to show that {qn} is bounded. We prove by
induction that
qn ≤ e
∑n
i=1 ai max(q0, q1).
Indeed,
q0 ≤ max(q0, q1),
q1 ≤ max(q0, q1) ≤ ea1 max(q0, q1).
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At induction step, we have
qn = anqn−1 + qn−2
≤ an e
∑n−1
i=1 ai max(q0, q1) + e
∑n−2
i=1 ai max(q0, q1)
≤ an e
∑n−1
i=1 ai max(q0, q1) + e
∑n−1
i=1 ai max(q0, q1)
= (an + 1) e
∑n−1
i=1 ai max(q0, q1)
≤ ean e
∑n−1
i=1 ai max(q0, q1)
= e
∑n
i=1 ai max(q0, q1).
This completes the proof. 
1.4.4 The Legendre theorem
An ordinary continued fraction
a0 +
1
a1 +
1
a2 +
1
. . .
,
is called a regular continued fraction if the coefficient a0 is an integer and all the
coefficients ai for i ≥ 1 are positive integers.
There is a standard way to generate a unique regular continued fraction from any
real number and it is this continued fraction we refer to when we say the continued
fraction of a real number. This continued fraction expansion of a number is formed
by subtracting away the integer part of it and inverting the remainder, and then
repeating this process again and again.
Definition 1.4.1 For a given number x ∈ R, a sequence {an}n≥0 is uniquely deter-
mined as follows
• x0 = x, a0 = bx0c,
• for each n ≥ 0, if xn ∈ Z then the process terminates, otherwise, define
xn+1 =
1
xn − an
, an+1 = bxn+1c.
The sequence {an}n≥0 is finite if x ∈ Q and infinite if x 6∈ Q. The resulting regular
continued fraction [a0, a1, a2, . . . ] is called “the regular continued fraction” of x. The
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convergents of the regular continued fraction of x are referred to as the convergents
of x.
From the construction in Definition 1.4.1, we can see that
x = x0 = a0 + (x0 − a0) = a0 +
1
x1
if x0 6∈ Z
= a0 +
1
a1 + (x1 − a1)
= a0 +
1
a1 +
1
x2
if x1 6∈ Z
= a0 +
1
a1 +
1
a2 + (x2 − a2)
= a0 +
1
a1 +
1
a2 +
1
x3
if x2 6∈ Z
= . . .
so
x = a0 +
1
a1 +
1
. . . an +
1
xn+1
. (1.5)
For example,
1000
987
= 1 +
13
987
= 1 +
1
987
13
= 1 +
1
75 +
12
13
= 1 +
1
75 +
1
13
12
= 1 +
1
75 +
1
1 +
1
12
.
The above process of constructing the continued fraction for 1000
987
is the exact mirror
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of the Euclidean division algorithm
1000 = 987× 1 + 13
987 = 13× 75 + 12
13 = 12× 1 + 1
12 = 1× 12 + 0.
Since the Euclidean division algorithm always terminates, the continued fraction of
a rational number has a finite length. On the other hand, the continued fraction of
an irrational number continues forever.
If x ∈ Q and the construction in Definition 1.4.1 terminates at n then
x = [a0, a1, . . . , an],
and in this case, we have two regular continued fractions that equal x:
x = [a0, a1, . . . , an]
= [a0, a1, . . . , an − 1, 1], (1.6)
but the first one [a0, a1, . . . , an] is “the regular continued fraction” of x, whereas,
the second one [a0, a1, . . . , an − 1, 1] is not.
If x 6∈ Q, it follows from the equation (1.5) that
[a0, a1, . . . , a2n] < x < [a0, a1, . . . , a2n+1] ∀n ≥ 0.
Since every regular continued fraction converges by Theorem 1.4.7, the regular
continued fraction [a0, a1, . . . ] of x must converge to x.
Theorem 1.4.9 (The Legendre Theorem) [29] Let p ∈ Z and q ∈ Z+ such that∣∣∣∣x− pq
∣∣∣∣ < 12q2 .
Then p
q
is equal to a convergent of the regular continued fraction of x.
Proof. If x = p
q
then p
q
is equal to the last convergent of x, so we assume that x 6= p
q
.
As noted above in (1.6), a rational number p
q
can be written as a regular continued
fraction of even and as a regular continued fraction of odd length. So, we will write
p
q
= [a0, a1, . . . , an]
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such that n is even if x > p
q
and n is odd in the case x < p
q
. Define sign(z) to be 1,
−1, or 0 if z is positive, negative or zero, respectively; then
sign(x− p
q
) = (−1)n.
If we define a by
x = [a0, a1, . . . , an, a], (1.7)
the theorem is proved if we can show that a > 1.
Since
p
q
= [a0, a1, . . . , an],
x = [a0, a1, . . . , an, a],
by the Euler-Wallis recursive formula,
p
q
=
pn
qn
,
x =
pn+1
qn+1
=
apn + pn−1
aqn + qn−1
,
so
x− p
q
=
apn + pn−1
aqn + qn−1
− pn
qn
=
pn−1qn − pnqn−1
qn(aqn + qn−1)
.
By Theorem 1.4.4,
x− p
q
=
(−1)n
qn(aqn + qn−1)
=
sign(x− p
q
)
qn(aqn + qn−1)
.
Therefore, ∣∣∣∣x− pq
∣∣∣∣ = 1qn(aqn + qn−1) .
The hypothesis ∣∣∣∣x− pq
∣∣∣∣ < 12q2
implies
qn(aqn + qn−1) > 2q
2. (1.8)
Since gcd(pn, qn) = 1 by Theorem 1.4.4 and
p
q
= pn
qn
, we have q ≥ qn. We also have
qn ≥ qn−1, so it follows from (1.8) that a > 1, and the proof is completed. 
Chapter 2
Continued Fraction Expansions
of e1/M
In this chapter, we will present a proof of the following continued fraction of e1/M
due to Euler, that for any positive real number M :
e1/M = 1 +
1
M − 1 +
1
1 +
1
1 +
1
3M − 1 +
1
1 +
1
1 +
1
5M − 1 +
1
. . .
(2.1)
Our proof contains two steps. In the first step, we show that
e1/M = 1 +
1
M − 1
2
+
1
4
3M +
1
4
5M +
1
4
7M +
1
4
. . .
(2.2)
19
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And in the second step of the proof, we use the algebraic identity
(2k + 1)M − 1 +
1
1 +
1
1 +
1
x
= (2k + 1)M − 1
2
+
1
4
1
2
+ x
to transform the continued fraction (2.2) into the form (2.1).
In a foundational publication on the theory of continued fractions, “De Fractionibus
Continuis Dissertatio” [19], Euler used the Ricatti differential equation to derive the
continued fraction (2.1). This continued fraction (2.1) can also be obtained from
a continued fraction of the function tanh z using the Hurwitz transformation (see
exercises 14 and 16, section 4.5.3 of [27]). When M = 1, we have the following
regular continued fraction expansion of e
e = 2 +
1
1 +
1
2 +
1
1 +
1
1 +
1
4 +
1
1 +
1
1 +
1
6 +
1
1 +
1
1 +
1
8 +
1
. . .
(2.3)
Since a rational number must have a finite regular continued fraction expansion,
this implies that e is irrational. Lagrange’s theorem [33] asserts that a real number
has a periodic regular continued fraction if and only if it is a quadratic irrational.
Since (2.3) is not periodic, e must not be algebraic of degree 2.
Using integration of the form
∫
e−rxxn(1− x)ndx, Hermite [22] gave the first proof
that e is transcendental. As a by-product, Hermite also derived the identity (2.3).
Based on Hermite’s work, Olds [34] gave an expository proof of the continued fraction
of e. Cohn [15] streamlined Olds’ proof into a short presentation. Osler [35] extended
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Cohn’s proof to the general case of e1/M . All of these proofs rely heavily on the
integration technique.
Here we will present a simple proof of the identity (2.1), which only involves the
manipulation of recurrence equations.
This chapter is based on the paper [41].
2.1 A new continued fraction expansion of e1/M
This is the first step of the proof. We will prove the following new continued fraction
M +
1
4
3M +
1
4
5M +
1
4
7M +
1
4
. . .
=
1
e1/M − 1
+
1
2
(2.4)
which gives rise to a new continued fraction expansion of e1/M
e1/M = 1 +
1
M − 1
2
+
1
4
3M +
1
4
5M +
1
4
7M +
1
4
. . .
Lemma 2.1.1 For a positive real number M , let
S0 =
∞∑
i=1
1
i!M i
S1 =
∞∑
i=1
i− 1
(i+ 1)!M i
...
Sk =
∞∑
i=1
(i− 1)(i− 2) . . . (i− k)
(i+ k)!M i
then
Sn+2 + (4n+ 6)MSn+1 − Sn = 0. (2.5)
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Proof. S0 = e
1/M − 1, and by the ratio test, we can see that each of the series Sk
converges to a positive number. We have
Sn − (4n+ 6)MSn+1
=
∞∑
i=1
(i− 1)(i− 2) . . . (i− n)
(i+ n)!M i
− (4n+ 6)
∞∑
i=1
(i− 1)(i− 2) . . . (i− n− 1)
(i+ n+ 1)!M i−1
=
∞∑
i=1
(i− 1)(i− 2) . . . (i− n)
(i+ n)!M i
− (4n+ 6)
∞∑
i=1
i(i− 1) . . . (i− n)
(i+ n+ 2)!M i
=
∞∑
i=1
(i− 1)(i− 2) . . . (i− n)[(i+ n+ 1)(i+ n+ 2)− (4n+ 6)i]
(i+ n+ 2)!M i
=
∞∑
i=1
(i− 1)(i− 2) . . . (i− n)(i− n− 1)(i− n− 2)
(i+ n+ 2)!M i
= Sn+2. 
We want to make the recurrence relation (2.5) hold for n = −1, so we define S−1 as
follows:
S−1 = S1 + 2MS0
=
∞∑
i=1
i− 1
(i+ 1)!M i
+ 2M
∞∑
i=1
1
i!M i
= 2 +
∞∑
i=1
i− 1
(i+ 1)!M i
+ 2
∞∑
i=2
1
i!M i−1
= 2 +
∞∑
i=1
i− 1
(i+ 1)!M i
+ 2
∞∑
i=1
1
(i+ 1)!M i
= 2 +
∞∑
i=1
i+ 1
(i+ 1)!M i
= 2 +
∞∑
i=1
1
i!M i
= e1/M + 1.
Now we have
Sn+2 + (4n+ 6)MSn+1 − Sn = 0, ∀n ≥ −1,
and we will use this recurrence relation to establish a finite continued fraction which
looks like (2.4).
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Lemma 2.1.2 Using the sequence {Sn} of Lemma 2.1.1, for any n ≥ 0,
M +
1
4
3M +
1
4
5M +
1
4
. . . (2n+ 1)M +
1
4
Sn
2Sn+1
=
1
e1/M − 1
+
1
2
.
Proof. Since
Sn+2 + (4n+ 6)MSn+1 − Sn = 0
we have
Sn
2Sn+1
= (2n+ 3)M +
Sn+2
2Sn+1
and
Sn
2Sn+1
= (2n+ 3)M +
1
4
Sn+1
2Sn+2
.
So for any n ≥ 0,
1
e1/M − 1
+
1
2
=
e1/M + 1
2(e1/M − 1)
=
S−1
2S0
= M +
1
4
S0
2S1
= M +
1
4
3M +
1
4
S1
2S2
= M +
1
4
3M +
1
4
5M +
1
4
S2
2S3
= . . .
= M +
1
4
3M +
1
4
5M +
1
4
. . . (2n+ 1)M +
1
4
Sn
2Sn+1
. 
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Lemma 2.1.2 almost gives us the continued fraction (2.4). Does Lemma 2.1.2 im-
mediately imply that the infinite continued fraction
[M, (
1
4
, 3M), (
1
4
, 5M), . . . ]
converges to 1
e1/M−1 +
1
2
?
Here is an example. Since x0 = 1−
√
2 is a root of the quadratic equation
x2 − 2x− 1 = 0,
we have x0 = 2 +
1
x0
. This gives us the following continued fraction of arbitrary
length
1−
√
2 = 2 +
1
2 +
1
. . . 2 +
1
2 + (−1−
√
2)
Does this mean the infinite continued fraction [2, (1, 2), (1, 2), . . . ] converges to the
value 1−
√
2? No, in fact, this continued fraction converges to 1 +
√
2.
The difference between Lemma 2.1.2 and the above “1 −
√
2 example” is that in
Lemma 2.1.2, the “trailing part” Sn
2Sn+1
is positive, whereas in the “1−
√
2 example”,
the “trailing part” (−1 −
√
2) is negative. Because Sn
2Sn+1
is positive, we can use
Lemma 2.1.2 to find the convergence value of the infinite continued fraction using
the Markov test which appears in the following theorem.
Theorem 2.1.1 [26] Suppose that the coefficients an, bn are all positive and that
the infinite continued fraction converges:
[a0, (b0, a1), (b1, a2), . . . ] = `.
Construct a sequence {zn} such that
z0 = a0 +
b0
a1 +
b1
. . . an−1 +
bn−1
an + zn
In this construction, if zn are all positive then z0 must be equal to `.
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Proof. Let τ0(x) = a0 + x, τk(x) = bk−1/(ak + x) then
z0 = Tn(zn) = τ0 ◦ τ1 ◦ · · · ◦ τn(zn)
Every function τk is continuous and monotonic on [0,+∞). Hence the same is true
for their composition Tn. Picking two limit values x = 0 and x = +∞, we obtain
that z0 must be in the interval with the end-points at
Tn(0) =
pn
qn
, Tn(+∞) =
pn−1
qn−1
Since the continued fraction is assumed to converge to `, we have z0 = `. 
Theorem 2.1.2 For any positive real number M ,
M +
1
4
3M +
1
4
5M +
1
4
7M +
1
4
. . .
=
1
e1/M − 1
+
1
2
.
Proof. The convergence is obtained from Theorem 1.4.6. By the Markov convergence
test (Theorem 2.1.1), Lemma 2.1.2 implies that the infinite continued fraction does
converge to 1
e1/M−1 +
1
2
. 
By Theorem 2.1.2, we obtain the following continued fraction expansion of e1/M
e1/M = 1 +
1
M − 1
2
+
1
4
3M +
1
4
5M +
1
4
7M +
1
4
. . .
and this completes the first step of the proof.
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2.2 A proof of the Euler continued fraction
In the second step of the proof, we will use the following algebraic identity
(2k + 1)M − 1 +
1
1 +
1
1 +
1
x
= (2k + 1)M − 1
2
+
1
4
1
2
+ x
(2.6)
to transform the previous continued fraction into the following Euler continued frac-
tion.
Theorem 2.2.1 For any positive real number M ,
e1/M = 1 +
1
M − 1 +
1
1 +
1
1 +
1
3M − 1 +
1
1 +
1
1 +
1
5M − 1 +
1
. . .
Proof. The coefficients of this continued fraction are eventually positive, and by
Theorem 1.4.6, the continued fraction converges.
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We apply the identity (2.6) repeatedly as follows
1 +
1
M− 1 +
1
1 +
1
1 +
1
3M − 1 +
1
1 +
1
1 +
1
5M − 1 +
1
. . .
= 1 +
1
M − 1
2
+
1
4
1
2
+ 3M− 1 +
1
1 +
1
1 +
1
5M − 1 +
1
. . .
= 1 +
1
M − 1
2
+
1
4
1
2
+ 3M − 1
2
+
1
4
1
2
+ 5M − 1 +
1
. . .
= . . .
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= 1 +
1
M − 1
2
+
1
4
1
2
+ 3M − 1
2
+
1
4
1
2
+ 5M − 1
2
+
1
4
1
2
+ 7M − 1
2
+
1
4
. . .
= 1 +
1
M − 1
2
+
1
4
3M +
1
4
5M +
1
4
7M +
1
4
. . .
= e1/M . 
We have now proved the continued fraction expansion formula for e1/M . 
Chapter 3
Continued Fraction Expansions
of e
In this chapter, we will present a new proof by contradiction of the following two
continued fractions [20] of Euler’s constant e:
e = 2 +
1
1 +
1
2 +
2
3 +
3
. . .
= 2 +
2
2 +
3
3 +
4
4 +
5
. . .
(3.1)
For the first identity, suppose that the continued fraction converges to x, then we
will determine a closed form formula for its subfraction as follows:
un = n+
n
n+ 1 +
n+ 1
n+ 2 +
n+ 2
n+ 3 +
n+ 3
. . .
= − n
n+ 1
×
x
n∑
k=0
(−1)k
k!
− 1
x
n+1∑
k=0
(−1)k
k!
− 1
.
This subfraction formula provides a surprising twist for a proof by contradiction.
Indeed, if x 6= e then
lim
n→∞
un = −
xe−1 − 1
xe−1 − 1
= −1,
which is utterly untrue as un > n.
29
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Similarly, for the second identity, suppose that the continued fraction converges to x,
then, having proved:
vn = n+
n+ 1
n+ 1 +
n+ 2
n+ 2 +
n+ 3
. . .
= −
x
n−1∑
k=0
(−1)k
k!
− 1
x
n∑
k=0
(−1)k
k!
− 1
,
if x 6= e then
lim
n→∞
vn = −
xe−1 − 1
xe−1 − 1
= −1,
which is utterly untrue as vn > n, so x = e.
As a by-product, we obtain the following two new continued fractions
n+
n
n+ 1 +
n+ 1
n+ 2 +
n+ 2
n+ 3 +
n+ 3
. . .
= − n
n+ 1
×
e
n∑
k=0
(−1)k
k!
− 1
e
n+1∑
k=0
(−1)k
k!
− 1
,
and
n+
n+ 1
n+ 1 +
n+ 2
n+ 2 +
n+ 3
. . .
= −
e
n−1∑
k=0
(−1)k
k!
− 1
e
n∑
k=0
(−1)k
k!
− 1
.
This chapter is based on the paper [43].
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3.1 Proof of the first continued fraction result
Theorem 3.1.1 For any integer n ≥ 1,
n+
n
n+ 1 +
n+ 1
n+ 2 +
n+ 2
n+ 3 +
n+ 3
. . .
= − n
n+ 1
×
e
n∑
k=0
(−1)k
k!
− 1
e
n+1∑
k=0
(−1)k
k!
− 1
,
and
2 +
1
1 +
1
2 +
2
3 +
3
. . .
= e.
Proof. By Theorem 1.4.6, we know that the first continued fraction of (3.1) con-
verges. Let x be this convergence value and construct the sequences {un}, {an},
{bn}, {cn}, {dn} as follows
u1 = 1 +
1
2 +
2
3 +
3
. . .
=
1
x− 2
=
xa1 + b1
xc1 + d1
,
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un = n+
n
n+ 1 +
n+ 1
n+ 2 +
n+ 2
. . .
=
n− 1
un−1 − (n− 1)
=
n− 1
xan−1 + bn−1
xcn−1 + dn−1
− (n− 1)
=
x(n− 1)cn−1 + (n− 1)dn−1
x(an−1 − (n− 1)cn−1) + (bn−1 − (n− 1)dn−1)
=
xan + bn
xcn + dn
.
Then we have the following recursive formulas
a1 = 0, b1 = 1, c1 = 1, d1 = −2,
an = (n− 1)cn−1, bn = (n− 1)dn−1,
cn = an−1 − (n− 1)cn−1, dn = bn−1 − (n− 1)dn−1, ∀n ≥ 2.
For any n ≥ 3, we have
an
n− 1
= cn−1 = an−2 − (n− 2)cn−2 = an−2 − an−1
⇒ an + (n− 1)an−1 − (n− 1)an−2 = 0
⇒ an − an−2 + (n− 1)an−1 − (n− 2)an−2 = 0.
So
n∑
k=3
(ak − ak−2 + (k − 1)ak−1 − (k − 2)ak−2) = 0,
which gives
an + an−1 − a2 − a1 + (n− 1)an−1 − a1 = 0.
It follows that for any n ≥ 2,
an + nan−1 = a2 + 2a1.
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Rewrite the above equation as
(−1)nan
n!
− (−1)
n−1an−1
(n− 1)!
= (a2 + 2a1)
(−1)n
n!
and taking the summation
n∑
k=2
(
(−1)kak
k!
− (−1)
k−1ak−1
(k − 1)!
)
= (a2 + 2a1)
n∑
k=2
(−1)k
k!
we get
(−1)nan
n!
− (−1)a1
1!
= (a2 + 2a1)
n∑
k=2
(−1)k
k!
, ∀n ≥ 1.
We derive the following closed form for an:
an = (−1)nn!
(
−a1 + (a2 + 2a1)
n∑
k=0
(−1)k
k!
)
, ∀n ≥ 1.
Similarly, we get the following closed form for bn:
bn = (−1)nn!
(
−b1 + (b2 + 2b1)
n∑
k=0
(−1)k
k!
)
, ∀n ≥ 1.
Substituting the values
a1 = 0, b1 = 1, a2 = 1, b2 = −2
we obtain
an = (−1)nn!
n∑
k=0
(−1)k
k!
bn = (−1)n+1n!
It follows that
cn =
an+1
n
= (−1)n+1 (n+ 1)!
n
n+1∑
k=0
(−1)k
k!
,
dn =
bn+1
n
= (−1)n (n+ 1)!
n
.
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Finally, we have
un =
xan + bn
xcn + dn
=
x(−1)nn!
n∑
k=0
(−1)k
k!
+ (−1)n+1n!
x(−1)n+1
(n+ 1)!
n
n+1∑
k=0
(−1)k
k!
+ (−1)n
(n+ 1)!
n
= − n
n+ 1
x
n∑
k=0
(−1)k
k!
− 1
x
n+1∑
k=0
(−1)k
k!
− 1
, ∀n ≥ 1.
This implies that x = e because if x 6= e then
lim
n→∞
un = −
xe−1 − 1
xe−1 − 1
= −1
which contradicts the obvious fact that un > n. 
3.2 Proof of the second continued fraction result
Theorem 3.2.1 For any integer n ≥ 1,
n+
n+ 1
n+ 1 +
n+ 2
n+ 2 +
n+ 3
. . .
= −
e
n−1∑
k=0
(−1)k
k!
− 1
e
n∑
k=0
(−1)k
k!
− 1
,
and
2 +
2
2 +
3
3 +
4
4 +
5
. . .
= e.
Proof. By Theorem 1.4.6, we know that the second continued fraction of (3.1)
converges. Let x be this convergence value and construct the sequences {vn}, {an},
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{bn}, {cn}, {dn} as follows
v1 = 1 +
2
2 +
3
3 +
4
. . .
= x− 1 = xa1 + b1
xc1 + d1
vn = n+
n+ 1
n+ 1 +
n+ 2
n+ 2 +
n+ 3
. . .
=
n
vn−1 − (n− 1)
=
n
xan−1 + bn−1
xcn−1 + dn−1
− (n− 1)
=
xncn−1 + ndn−1
x(an−1 − (n− 1)cn−1) + (bn−1 − (n− 1)dn−1)
=
xan + bn
xcn + dn
.
Then we have the following recursive formulas
a1 = 1, b1 = −1, c1 = 0, d1 = 1,
an = ncn−1, bn = ndn−1,
cn = an−1 − (n− 1)cn−1, dn = bn−1 − (n− 1)dn−1, ∀n ≥ 2.
For any n ≥ 3,
cn = an−1 − (n− 1)cn−1 = (n− 1)cn−2 − (n− 1)cn−1
⇒ cn + (n− 1)cn−1 − (n− 1)cn−2 = 0
⇒ cn − cn−1 + ncn−1 − (n− 1)cn−2 = 0.
Taking summation
n∑
k=3
(ck − ck−1 + kck−1 − (k − 1)ck−2) = 0
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and we get
cn − c2 + ncn−1 − 2c1 = 0.
We have
cn + ncn−1 = c2 + 2c1, ∀n ≥ 2
so
(−1)ncn
n!
− (−1)
n−1cn−1
(n− 1)!
= (c2 + 2c1)
(−1)n
n!
.
Taking summation again
n∑
k=2
(
(−1)kck
k!
− (−1)
k−1ck−1
(k − 1)!
)
= (c2 + 2c1)
n∑
k=2
(−1)k
k!
and we get
(−1)ncn
n!
− (−1)c1
1!
= (c2 + 2c1)
n∑
k=2
(−1)k
k!
, ∀n ≥ 1.
Therefore,
cn = (−1)nn!
(
−c1 + (c2 + 2c1)
n∑
k=0
(−1)k
k!
)
, ∀n ≥ 1
and similarly,
dn = (−1)nn!
(
−d1 + (d2 + 2d1)
n∑
k=0
(−1)k
k!
)
, ∀n ≥ 1
Substituting the values
c1 = 0, d1 = 1, c2 = 1, d2 = −2,
we obtain
cn = (−1)nn!
n∑
k=0
(−1)k
k!
dn = (−1)n+1n!
It follows that
an = ncn−1 = (−1)n−1n!
n−1∑
k=0
(−1)k
k!
bn = ndn−1 = (−1)nn!
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Finally,
vn =
xan + bn
xcn + dn
=
x(−1)n−1n!
n−1∑
k=0
(−1)k
k!
+ (−1)nn!
x(−1)nn!
n∑
k=0
(−1)k
k!
+ (−1)n+1n!
= −
x
n−1∑
k=0
(−1)k
k!
− 1
x
n∑
k=0
(−1)k
k!
− 1
, ∀n ≥ 1.
So, if x 6= e we would have limn→∞ vn = −1, which contradicts the fact that vn > n.
Therefore, x = e. 
Chapter 4
A “New Year” Continued Fraction
In the Mathematics Magazine, December 2014 issue [40], the following continued
fraction is displayed to celebrate the new year
2014 = 2015−
1× 2015
2017−
2× 2016
2019−
3× 2017
2021−
4× 2018
. . .
In this chapter, we will prove a general form of this continued fraction
a+ 1−
1(a+ 1)
a+ 3−
2(a+ 2)
a+ 5−
3(a+ 3)
a+ 7−
4(a+ 4)
. . .
=

a if a ≥ 0
0 if a < 0 and a 6∈ Z
(4.1)
38
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We derive the previous infinite continued fraction from the following finite continued
fraction
a+ 1−
1(a+ 1)
a+ 3−
2(a+ 2)
a+ 5−
3(a+ 3)
. . . a+ 2n− 1−
n(a+ n)
a+ 2n+ 1
=

1
∑n
k=0
1
k + 1
if a = 0
a
1−
(n+ 1)!
(a+ 1)(a+ 2) . . . (a+ n+ 1)
if a 6= 0
The following identity due to Euler is a useful identity for generating continued
fractions
1
1
α1
−
1
α2
+
1
α3
−
1
α4
+ . . .
= α1 +
α21
α2 − α1 +
α22
α3 − α2 +
α23
α4 − α3 +
α24
. . .
. (4.2)
If we take αk = (−1)k+1k and equate 1/
(∑∞
k=1
1
k
)
to 0, we obtain the following
interesting continued fraction for zero
0 = 1−
12
3−
22
5−
32
7−
42
. . .
(4.3)
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Inductively, we can derive from (4.3) the following
1 = 3−
22
5−
32
7−
42
9−
52
. . .
,
2 = 5−
32
7−
42
9−
52
11−
62
. . .
,
and in general
a = 2a+ 1−
(a+ 1)2
2a+ 3−
(a+ 2)2
2a+ 5−
(a+ 3)2
2a+ 7−
(a+ 4)2
. . .
.
We can see that the identity (4.3) is a special case of our identity (4.1) when a =
0. However, while the identity (4.3) is obtained from Euler’s identity (4.2), our
identity (4.1) is not. Moreover, our identity (4.1) holds for all positive real numbers a.
This chapter is based on the paper [42].
4.1 The finite continued fraction
In order to prove (4.1), we will establish a closed form formula for its convergents –
which is the following finite continued fraction.
Theorem 4.1.1 For any natural number n, and for any complex number a which
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is not a negative integer, we have
a+ 1−
1(a+ 1)
a+ 3−
2(a+ 2)
a+ 5−
3(a+ 3)
. . . a+ 2n− 1−
n(a+ n)
a+ 2n+ 1
=

1
∑n
k=0
1
k + 1
if a = 0
a
1−
(n+ 1)!
(a+ 1)(a+ 2) . . . (a+ n+ 1)
if a 6= 0
Proof. By the Euler-Wallis formulas,
p−2 = 0, p−1 = 1, pn = (a+ 2n+ 1)pn−1 − n(a+ n)pn−2 ∀n ≥ 0
q−1 = 0, q0 = 1, qn = (a+ 2n+ 1)qn−1 − n(a+ n)qn−2 ∀n ≥ 1
We rewrite the recurrence formula as
qn − nqn−1 = (a+ n+ 1)qn−1 − n(a+ n)qn−2
and
qn
n!
− qn−1
(n− 1)!
=
(a+ n+ 1)qn−1
n!
− (a+ n)qn−2
(n− 1)!
.
Taking the summation we obtain
qn
n!
− q0 =
(a+ n+ 1)qn−1
n!
− (a+ 1)q−1
so
qn − (a+ n+ 1)qn−1 = (q0 − (a+ 1)q−1)n! .
Using the Gamma function [16], which is defined for all complex numbers except the
non-positive integers, with the identity Γ(z+1) = zΓ(z), rewrite the above equation
as
qn
Γ(a+ n+ 2)
− qn−1
Γ(a+ n+ 1)
= (q0 − (a+ 1)q−1)
n!
Γ(n+ a+ 2)
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and taking the summation again we get
qn
Γ(a+ n+ 2)
− q−1
Γ(a+ 1)
= (q0 − (a+ 1)q−1)
n∑
k=0
k!
Γ(k + a+ 2)
so
qn
Γ(a+ n+ 2)
=
q−1
Γ(a+ 1)
+ (q0 − (a+ 1)q−1)
n∑
k=0
k!
Γ(k + a+ 2)
Similarly, we have
pn
Γ(a+ n+ 2)
=
p−1
Γ(a+ 1)
+ (p0 − (a+ 1)p−1)
n∑
k=0
k!
Γ(k + a+ 2)
Substitute the values q−1 = 0, q0 = 1, p−1 = 1, p0 = a+ 1, we obtain
qn
Γ(a+ n+ 2)
=
n∑
k=0
k!
Γ(k + a+ 2)
pn
Γ(a+ n+ 2)
=
1
Γ(a+ 1)
Thus, we have the following closed form formula for the convergent
pn
qn
=
1
Γ(a+ 1)
∑n
k=0
k!
Γ(k + a+ 2)
There are two cases.
Case 1: if a = 0 then
pn
qn
=
1
∑n
k=0
1
k + 1
Case 2: if a 6= 0, we use the following identity
k!
Γ(k + a+ 1)
− (k + 1)!
Γ(k + a+ 2)
=
k!
Γ(k + a+ 2)
((k+a+1)−(k+1)) = a k!
Γ(k + a+ 2)
,
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then
pn
qn
=
1
Γ(a)
∑n
k=0
(
k!
Γ(k + a+ 1)
−
(k + 1)!
Γ(k + a+ 2)
)
=
1
Γ(a)
(
1
Γ(a+ 1)
−
(n+ 1)!
Γ(n+ a+ 2)
) (4.4)
and finally,
pn
qn
=
a
1−
(n+ 1)!
(a+ 1)(a+ 2) . . . (a+ n+ 1)
(4.5)
This completes the proof. 
4.2 The infinite continued fraction
Having established the closed form formula for the convergent in Theorem 4.1.1, we
are now ready to derive the main continued fraction in Theorem 4.2.1.
Theorem 4.2.1 For any real number a,
a+ 1−
1(a+ 1)
a+ 3−
2(a+ 2)
a+ 5−
3(a+ 3)
a+ 7−
4(a+ 4)
. . .
=

a if a ≥ 0
0 if a < 0 and a 6∈ Z
(4.6)
Proof. The case a = 0 is the identity (4.3). When a > 0, we have
(a+ 1)(a+ 2) . . . (a+ n+ 1)
(n+ 1)!
= (1 +
a
1
)(1 +
a
2
) . . . (1 +
a
n
)(1 +
a
n+ 1
)
> 1 +
a
1
+
a
2
+ · · ·+ a
n
+
a
n+ 1
→ +∞
So from (4.5), we have limn→∞
pn
qn
= a and the theorem follows.
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When a < −1 and a 6∈ Z, let A = b−ac ≥ 1, then 0 < a+ A+ 1 < 1 and we have
0 <
(a+ A+ 1)(a+ A+ 2) . . . (a+ n+ 1)
1× 2× · · · × (n+ 1− A)
< 1
so
0 <
(a+ A+ 1)(a+ A+ 2) . . . (a+ n+ 1)
(n+ 1)!
<
1
n+ 1
→ 0.
Hence, from (4.5), we have limn→∞
pn
qn
= 0 and the theorem follows.
When −1 < a < 0, using the following well-known limit [1] that, for any complex
number α,
lim
n→∞
Γ(n+ α)
Γ(n)nα
= 1,
we have
lim
n→∞
Γ(n+ a+ 2)
(n+ 1)!
= lim
n→∞
Γ(n+ a+ 2)
Γ(n)na+2
na+1
n+ 1
= 1× 0 = 0.
So from (4.4), we have limn→∞
pn
qn
= 0 and the theorem follows. 
Chapter 5
The First Two Harmonic
Continued Fractions
Define harmonic continued fractions [12] by:
HCF (t) =
t
1
+
1
t
2
+
1
t
3
+
1
. . .
.
Since the harmonic series
∑
1
n
diverges, by the Seidel-Stern Theorem (Theorem 1.4.8),
the continued fraction HCF (t) converges for any positive real number t.
In this chapter, we study HCF (1) and HCF (2) and show that
HCF (1) =
1
1
+
1
1
2
+
1
1
3
+
1
1
4
+
1
. . .
=
2
π − 2
and
HCF (2) =
2
1
+
1
2
2
+
1
2
3
+
1
2
4
+
1
. . .
=
1
2 ln 2− 1
.
45
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The values of HCF (1) and HCF (2) can be derived from the following continued
fractions of Euler [20]:
1 +
1
1 +
1× 2
1 +
2× 3
1 +
3× 4
. . .
=
π
2
, 2 +
1× 2
2 +
2× 3
2 +
3× 4
2 +
4× 5
. . .
=
1
2 ln 2− 1
.
Euler’s proof involved the Wallis product and differential equations. Another ele-
mentary proof for HCF (1) was given by Pickett and Coleman [36] in 2008. In this
chapter, we offer an elementary and direct proof. Our proof uses the Euler-Wallis re-
currence formula to establish the following closed form formulas for the convergents
of the continued fractions HCF (1) and HCF (2):
1
1
+
1
1
2
+
1
1
3
+
1
. . . +
1
1
2n− 1
=
1
1
2n
2242 . . . (2n)2
1232 . . . (2n− 1)2
− 1
,
1
1
+
1
1
2
+
1
1
3
+
1
. . . +
1
1
2n
=
1
1
2n+ 1
2242 . . . (2n)2
1232 . . . (2n− 1)2
− 1
,
2
1
+
1
2
2
+
1
2
3
+
1
. . . +
1
2
n
=
1
n−1∑
i=0
(−1)i
(i+ 1)(i+ 2)
.
This chapter is based on the paper [12].
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5.1 HCF(1)
The following theorem establishes closed form formulas for the numerator pn and
the denominator qn of the convergents of HCF (1).
Theorem 5.1.1 The numerator pn and the denominator qn of the convergents of
HCF (1) are
p2n =
n∏
i=1
2i+ 1
2i
, ∀n ≥ 0,
p2n+1 =
n+1∏
i=1
2i+ 1
2i
, ∀n ≥ 0,
q2n =
(
1
2n+ 2
2242 . . . (2n+ 2)2
1232 . . . (2n+ 1)2
− 1
) n∏
i=1
2i+ 1
2i
, ∀n ≥ 0,
q2n+1 =
(
1
2n+ 3
2242 . . . (2n+ 2)2
1232 . . . (2n+ 1)2
− 1
) n+1∏
i=1
2i+ 1
2i
, ∀n ≥ 0.
Proof. By Theorem 1.4.2,
pn =
(
1
n(n+ 1)
+
n− 1
n+ 1
+ 1
)
pn−2 −
n− 1
n+ 1
pn−4
=
2n2 + 1
n(n+ 1)
pn−2 −
n− 1
n+ 1
pn−4, ∀n ≥ 2
So
p2n =
8n2 + 1
2n(2n+ 1)
p2n−2 −
2n− 1
2n+ 1
p2n−4, ∀n ≥ 1,
p2n+1 =
8n2 + 8n+ 3
(2n+ 1)(2n+ 2)
p2n−1 −
2n
2n+ 2
p2n−3, ∀n ≥ 1.
For each n ≥ −1, let
p2n = p
′
2n
n∏
i=1
2i+ 1
2i
and p2n+1 = p
′
2n+1
n+1∏
i=1
2i+ 1
2i
,
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then
2n+ 1
2n
2n− 1
2n− 2
p′2n =
8n2 + 1
2n(2n+ 1)
2n− 1
2n− 2
p′2n−2 −
2n− 1
2n+ 1
p′2n−4, ∀n ≥ 2,
2n+ 3
2n+ 2
2n+ 1
2n
p′2n+1 =
8n2 + 8n+ 3
(2n+ 1)(2n+ 2)
2n+ 1
2n
p′2n−1 −
2n
2n+ 2
p′2n−3, ∀n ≥ 1.
This simplifies to
(2n+ 1)2 p′2n = (8n
2 + 1) p′2n−2 − 2n(2n− 2) p′2n−4, ∀n ≥ 2,
(2n+ 3)(2n+ 1) p′2n+1 = (8n
2 + 8n+ 3) p′2n−1 − 4n2 p′2n−3, ∀n ≥ 1,
and so,
(2n+ 1)2 (p′2n − p′2n−2) = 2n(2n− 2) (p′2n−2 − p′2n−4), ∀n ≥ 2
(2n+ 3)(2n+ 1) (p′2n+1 − p′2n−1) = 4n2 (p′2n−1 − p′2n−3), ∀n ≥ 1
Therefore,
p′2n − p′2n−2 =
2n(2n− 2)
(2n+ 1)2
(p′2n−2 − p′2n−4), ∀n ≥ 2, (5.1)
p′2n+1 − p′2n−1 =
4n2
(2n+ 3)(2n+ 1)
(p′2n−1 − p′2n−3), ∀n ≥ 1. (5.2)
We have p−1 = 1, p0 = 1, p1 =
3
2
, p2 =
3
2
, so
p′−1 = p
′
0 = p
′
1 = p
′
2 = 1.
It follows that
p′n = 1, ∀n ≥ −1.
This gives us the desired closed form formula for pn:
p2n =
n∏
i=1
2i+ 1
2i
and p2n+1 =
n+1∏
i=1
2i+ 1
2i
, ∀n ≥ 0.
Defining a sequence {q′n} for {qn} similar to {p′n} for {pn}, we seek for {q′n} equations
corresponding to (5.1) and (5.2). With q−1 = 0, q0 = 1, q1 =
1
2
, q2 =
7
6
, we have
q′−1 = 0, q
′
0 = 1, q
′
1 =
1
3
, q′2 =
7
9
.
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This gives us
q′2n − q′2n−2 =
2n(2n− 2)
(2n+ 1)2
. . .
(4)(2)
52
(q′2 − q′0)
= −2n(2n− 2)
(2n+ 1)2
. . .
(4)(2)
52
2
9
= − 1
2n
2242 . . . (2n)2
1232 . . . (2n+ 1)2
, ∀n ≥ 1,
q′2n+1 − q′2n−1 =
(2n)2
(2n+ 3)(2n+ 1)
. . .
22
(5)(3)
(q′1 − q′−1)
=
(2n)2
(2n+ 3)(2n+ 1)
. . .
22
(5)(3)
1
3
=
1
2n+ 3
2242 . . . (2n)2
1232 . . . (2n+ 1)2
, ∀n ≥ 1.
Simple algebraic manipulation gives us
q′2n − q′2n−2 =
1
2n+ 2
2242 . . . (2n+ 2)2
1232 . . . (2n+ 1)2
− 1
2n
2242 . . . (2n)2
1232 . . . (2n− 1)2
, ∀n ≥ 1,
q′2n+1 − q′2n−1 =
1
2n+ 3
2242 . . . (2n+ 2)2
1232 . . . (2n+ 1)2
− 1
2n+ 1
2242 . . . (2n)2
1232 . . . (2n− 1)2
, ∀n ≥ 1.
Replacing n by i and summing over i, from 1 to n, we find that
q′2n − q′0 =
1
2n+ 2
2242 . . . (2n+ 2)2
1232 . . . (2n+ 1)2
− 1
2
22
12
, ∀n ≥ 0,
q′2n+1 − q′1 =
1
2n+ 3
2242 . . . (2n+ 2)2
1232 . . . (2n+ 1)2
− 1
3
22
12
, ∀n ≥ 0.
Therefore,
q′2n =
1
2n+ 2
2242 . . . (2n+ 2)2
1232 . . . (2n+ 1)2
− 1, ∀n ≥ 0,
q′2n+1 =
1
2n+ 3
2242 . . . (2n+ 2)2
1232 . . . (2n+ 1)2
− 1, ∀n ≥ 0.
From here we obtain the desired closed form formula for qn. 
The following theorem is a consequence of Theorem 5.1.1.
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Theorem 5.1.2 For any natural number n ≥ 1,
1
1
+
1
1
2
+
1
1
3
+
1
. . . +
1
1
2n− 1
=
1
1
2n
2242 . . . (2n)2
1232 . . . (2n− 1)2
− 1
,
1
1
+
1
1
2
+
1
1
3
+
1
. . . +
1
1
2n
=
1
1
2n+ 1
2242 . . . (2n)2
1232 . . . (2n− 1)2
− 1
.
We are now ready to determine the value of HCF (1).
Theorem 5.1.3
HCF (1) =
1
1
+
1
1
2
+
1
1
3
+
1
1
4
+
1
. . .
=
2
π − 2
Proof. By Theorem 5.1.1,
q2n
p2n
=
1
2n+ 2
2242 . . . (2n+ 2)2
1232 . . . (2n+ 1)2
− 1,
q2n+1
p2n+1
=
1
2n+ 3
2242 . . . (2n+ 2)2
1232 . . . (2n+ 1)2
− 1.
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We have,
Γ
(
n+
3
2
)
=
(
n+
1
2
)
Γ
(
n+
1
2
)
=
(
n+
1
2
)(
n− 1
2
)
Γ
(
n− 1
2
)
=
(
n+
1
2
)(
n− 1
2
)
. . .
1
2
Γ
(
1
2
)
=
2n+ 1
2
2n− 1
2
. . .
1
2
√
π.
It follows that
q2n
p2n
=
π
2
(n+ 1)Γ(n+ 1)2
Γ(n+ 3
2
)2
− 1→ π
2
− 1.
The above limit is due to the fact [1] that, for any complex number a,
lim
n→∞
na Γ(n)
Γ(n+ a)
= 1,
we have used a = 1
2
.
Further
lim
n→∞
q2n+1
p2n+1
= lim
n→∞
q2n
p2n
=
π
2
− 1.
The reciprocal of this limit shows that HCF (1) = 2
π−2 ≈ 1.75. 
5.2 HCF(2)
The following theorem establishes closed form formulas for the numerator pn and
the denominator qn of the convergents of HCF (2).
Theorem 5.2.1 For any n ≥ 0, the numerator pn and the denominator qn of the
convergents of HCF (2) are
pn = n+ 2,
qn = (n+ 2)
n∑
i=0
(−1)i
(i+ 1)(i+ 2)
.
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Proof. By the Euler-Wallis formula, the convergents pn
qn
are determined by the
following recurrence relations
p−2 = 0, p−1 = 1, pn =
2
n+ 1
pn−1 + pn−2, ∀n ≥ 0,
q−2 = 1, q−1 = 0, qn =
2
n+ 1
qn−1 + qn−2, ∀n ≥ 0.
We have
(n+ 1)pn = 2pn−1 + (n+ 1)pn−2, ∀n ≥ 0,
(n+ 1)pn + npn−1 = (n+ 2)pn−1 + (n+ 1)pn−2, ∀n ≥ 0,
(−1)n(n+ 1)pn − (−1)n−1npn−1 = (−1)n(n+ 2)pn−1 − (−1)n−1(n+ 1)pn−2, ∀n ≥ 0.
Taking summation, we have
(−1)n(n+ 1)pn = (−1)n(n+ 2)pn−1 − (−1)−1p−2, ∀n ≥ 0,
(n+ 1)pn = (n+ 2)pn−1 + (−1)np−2, ∀n ≥ 0.
Since p−2 = 0, it follows that
(n+ 1)pn = (n+ 2)pn−1, ∀n ≥ 0,
pn
n+ 2
=
pn−1
n+ 1
= · · · = p−1
1
= 1, ∀n ≥ 0,
pn = n+ 2, ∀n ≥ 0.
Similarly,
(n+ 1)qn = (n+ 2)qn−1 + (−1)nq−2, ∀n ≥ 0.
Since q−2 = 1, it follows that
(n+ 1)qn = (n+ 2)qn−1 + (−1)n, ∀n ≥ 0,
qn
n+ 2
=
qn−1
n+ 1
+
(−1)n
(n+ 1)(n+ 2)
, ∀n ≥ 0.
Replacing n by i and summing from i = 0 to i = n, we obtain
qn
n+ 2
=
q−1
1
+
n∑
i=0
(−1)i
(i+ 1)(i+ 2)
=
n∑
i=0
(−1)i
(i+ 1)(i+ 2)
, ∀n ≥ 0,
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and this gives the desired closed form formula for qn. 
The following theorem is a consequence of Theorem 5.2.1.
Theorem 5.2.2 For any natural number n ≥ 1,
2
1
+
1
2
2
+
1
2
3
+
1
. . . +
1
2
n
=
1
n−1∑
i=0
(−1)i
(i+ 1)(i+ 2)
.
We are now ready to determine the value of HCF (2).
Theorem 5.2.3
HCF (2) =
2
1
+
1
2
2
+
1
2
3
+
1
2
4
+
1
. . .
=
1
2 ln 2− 1
Proof. By Theorem 5.2.1,
qn
pn
=
n∑
i=0
(−1)i
(i+ 1)(i+ 2)
So
lim
n→∞
qn
pn
= lim
n→∞
n∑
i=0
(−1)i
(i+ 1)(i+ 2)
= lim
n→∞
n∑
i=0
(−1)i
(
1
i+ 1
− 1
i+ 2
)
= lim
n→∞
n∑
i=0
(
(−1)i
i+ 1
+
(−1)i+1
i+ 2
)
= −1 + 2 lim
n→∞
n∑
i=0
(−1)i
i+ 1
= 2 ln 2− 1.
The reciprocal of this limit gives HCF (2) = 1
2 ln 2−1 ≈ 2.59 . 
Chapter 6
The General Harmonic Continued
Fractions
In this chapter, we consider the harmonic continued fraction
HCF (t) =
t
1
+
1
t
2
+
1
t
3
+
1
. . .
,
for a general value of t ∈ R+.
Since the harmonic series
∑
1
n
diverges, by the Seidel-Stern Theorem (Theorem 1.4.8),
the continued fraction HCF (t) converges for any positive real number t.
In Chapter 5, we studied HCF (1) and HCF (2) and showed that
HCF (1) =
1
1
+
1
1
2
+
1
1
3
+
1
1
4
+
1
. . .
=
2
π − 2
54
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and
HCF (2) =
2
1
+
1
2
2
+
1
2
3
+
1
2
4
+
1
. . .
=
1
2 ln 2− 1
.
In this chapter, we study HCF (t) for t ∈ R+ and derive explicit formulas for the
numerator and the denominator of the convergents. In particular, when t = 2a is an
even positive integer, we can determine the exact value of HCF (t) (Theorem 6.6.1):
HCF (2a) =
(−1)a−1
2a ln 2− 1− 2a
(
1−
1
2
+
1
3
−
1
4
+ · · · −
1
2ba
2
c
).
Here are the first five harmonic continued fractions for the even case:
HCF (2) =
1
2 ln 2− 1
≈ 2.59,
HCF (4) =
1
3− 4 ln 2
≈ 4.40,
HCF (6) =
1
6 ln 2− 4
≈ 6.29,
HCF (8) =
1
17
3
− 8 ln 2
≈ 8.23,
HCF (10) =
1
10 ln 2− 41
6
≈ 10.19.
In order to establish this result, we define and study the following convolution al-
ternating power sums
Ti,j(n) =
n∑
k=0
(−1)kki(n− k)j
and prove some identities involving Euler polynomials and Stirling numbers, which
are of independent interest.
What about the case where t is an odd integer? As in all the cases where t is even,
the value of HCF (t) is written in terms of ln 2, and HCF (1) = 2
π−2 , we conjecture
that for t is an odd integer, HCF (t) is a simple rational function of π. It is our
future work to determine this function.
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6.1 Some preliminary results
We will use f (n) to denote the nth derivative of a function f .
We will use x[n] and x
[n] to denote the falling and rising factorials;
[
n
k
]
and s1(n, k)
the unsigned and signed Stirling numbers of the first kind; and s2(n, k) the Stirling
numbers of the second kind [1], which can be defined as
x[n] = x(x− 1)(x− 2) . . . (x− n+ 1) =
n∑
k=0
s1(n, k)x
k, (6.1)
x[n] = x(x+ 1) . . . (x+ n− 1) =
n∑
k=0
[n
k
]
xk, (6.2)
xn =
n∑
k=0
s2(n, k)x[k]. (6.3)
We have
s1(n, k) = (−1)n+k
[n
k
]
and
[n
k
]
= |s1(n, k)|. (6.4)
Throughout this paper, En(x) denotes an Euler polynomial. Euler polynomials can
be defined using the generating series
2exz
ez + 1
=
∞∑
i=0
Ei(x)
zi
i!
, (6.5)
Here are the first few Euler polynomials: E0(x) = 1, E1(x) = x− 12 , E2(x) = x
2−x,
E3(x) = x
3 − 3
2
x2 + 1
4
, E4(x) = x
4 − 2x3 + x. The following are some well-known
properties of the Euler polynomials [1], [14]:
En(−x) = (−1)n (2xn − En(x)), (6.6)
En(x+ y) =
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
Ek(x)y
n−k. (6.7)
Lemma 6.1.1 For any integer n > 0,
n∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
(−i)[n−1] = 2(−1)n−1n!.
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Proof. Since (−i)[n−1] = 0 when 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 2, we have
n∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
(−i)[n−1] =
(
n
n− 1
)
(1− n)[n−1] +
(
n
n
)
(−n)[n−1] = 2(−1)n−1n!. 
Lemma 6.1.2 For any integer n ≥ 0,
−2nxn−1 +
n∑
i=1
xn−iEi−1(x) =
n∑
i=1
(−1)ixn−iEi−1(−x).
Proof. Using (6.6), we have
Ei−1(−x) = (−1)i−1(2xi−1 − Ei−1(x))
so
(−1)ixn−iEi−1(−x) = −2xn−1 + xn−iEi−1(x).
Therefore,
n∑
i=1
(−1)ixn−iEi−1(−x) = −2nxn−1 +
n∑
i=1
xn−iEi−1(x). 
Lemma 6.1.3 For any integer n ≥ 0,
n∑
i=1
(
n
i
)
xn−iEi−1(0) =
n∑
i=1
xn−iEi−1(x).
Proof. Let
zn =
n∑
i=1
(
n
i
)
xn−iEi−1(0);
then
zn =
n−1∑
i=1
(
n− 1
i
)
xn−iEi−1(0) +
n∑
i=1
(
n− 1
i− 1
)
xn−iEi−1(0)
= x
n−1∑
i=1
(
n− 1
i
)
xn−1−iEi−1(0) +
n−1∑
j=0
(
n− 1
j
)
xn−1−jEj(0)
= xzn−1 +
n−1∑
j=0
(
n− 1
j
)
xn−1−jEj(0).
By (6.7),
zn = xzn−1 + En−1(x).
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Therefore,
En−1(x)
xn
=
zn
xn
− zn−1
xn−1
and
n∑
i=1
Ei−1(x)
xi
=
zn
xn
− z0 =
zn
xn
.
It follows that
zn =
n∑
i=1
xn−iEi−1(x). 
6.2 Convolution alternating power sums
Let Ti(n) denote the alternating power sum
Ti(n) =
n∑
k=0
(−1)kki,
with the convention that 00 = 1. In this section, we define the convolution alternat-
ing power sum Ti,j(n) as follows
Definition 6.2.1 For any integers i, j ≥ 0, define the following convolution alter-
nating power sum
Ti,j(n) =
n∑
k=0
(−1)kki(n− k)j.
We will give explicit formulas for the convolution alternating power sums based on
the alternating power sums as well as on the Euler polynomials. Using the convolu-
tion alternating power sum, we establish some limit theorems involving convolution
summations of alternating powers and rising factorials. These limit results will be
used later to calculate the limit values of the harmonic continued fractions.
The alternating power sum can be determined based on the Euler polynomials as
follows [1], [14]:
Ti(n) =
(−1)nEi(n+ 1) + Ei(0)
2
, ∀n, i ≥ 0. (6.8)
Motivated by the example of Ti(n), we define:
Definition 6.2.2 P (n) is called an alternating polynomial if it has the form
P (n) = f(n) + (−1)ng(n)
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where f(n) and g(n) are two polynomials in variable n. In this case, the notations
P+(n) and P−(n) are used to denote f(n) and g(n), respectively.
Remark that if P (n) is an alternating polynomial, then P+(n) and P−(n) are
uniquely determined by P (n). (In other contexts, the terminology “alternating
polynomial” refers to polynomials in several variables which change sign when two
variables are interchanged.)
6.2.1 Some algebraic identities
Theorem 6.2.1 For any integers i, j ≥ 0,
Tj,i(n) = (−1)n Ti,j(n),
T+j,i(n) = T
−
i,j(n).
Proof. We have
Ti,j(n) =
n∑
k=0
(−1)kki(n− k)j =
n∑
k=0
(−1)n−k(n− k)ikj
= (−1)n
n∑
k=0
(−1)kkj(n− k)i
= (−1)n Tj,i(n),
thus,
T+i,j(n) + (−1)n T−i,j(n) = (−1)n
(
T+j,i(n) + (−1)n T−j,i(n)
)
= T−j,i(n) + (−1)n T+j,i(n),
and it follows that T+j,i(n) = T
−
i,j(n) and T
−
j,i(n) = T
+
i,j(n). 
The following theorem shows how to calculate the convolution alternating power
sum Ti,j(n) in term of the alternating power sum Ti(n).
Theorem 6.2.2 For any integers i, j ≥ 0, Ti,j(n) is an alternating polynomial and
Ti,j(n) =
j∑
k=0
(−1)j−k
(
j
k
)
nkTi+j−k(n).
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Proof. We have
Ti,j(n) =
n∑
k=0
(−1)kki(n− k)j =
n∑
k=0
(−1)kki
j∑
`=0
(
j
`
)
n`(−k)j−`
=
j∑
`=0
(−1)j−`
(
j
`
)
n`
n∑
k=0
(−1)kki+j−`
=
j∑
`=0
(−1)j−`
(
j
`
)
n`Ti+j−`(n),
and since each Ti+j−`(n) is an alternating polynomial, Ti,j(n) is also an alternating
polynomial. 
The following theorem shows how to calculate the convolution alternating power
sum Ti,j(n) in term of the Euler polynomial values Ei(0).
Theorem 6.2.3 For any integers i, j ≥ 0,
Ti,j(n) =
1
2
(
j∑
k=0
(−1)j−k
(
j
k
)
nkEi+j−k(0) + (−1)n
i∑
k=0
(−1)i−k
(
i
k
)
nkEi+j−k(0)
)
.
Proof. By Theorem 6.2.2,
Ti,j(n) =
j∑
k=0
(−1)j−k
(
j
k
)
nkTi+j−k(n).
Using the relation (6.8) between the alternating power sums and the Euler polyno-
mials, we have
Ti,j(n) =
j∑
k=0
(−1)j−k
(
j
k
)
nk
(−1)nEi+j−k(n+ 1) + Ei+j−k(0)
2
.
It follows that
T+i,j(n) =
1
2
j∑
k=0
(−1)j−k
(
j
k
)
nkEi+j−k(0).
Applying the above formula for T+j,i(n) and using Theorem 6.2.1, we have
T−i,j(n) = T
+
j,i(n) =
1
2
i∑
k=0
(−1)i−k
(
i
k
)
nkEi+j−k(0).
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Therefore,
Ti,j(n) = T
+
i,j(n) + (−1)nT−i,j(n)
=
1
2
(
j∑
k=0
(−1)j−k
(
j
k
)
nkEi+j−k(0) + (−1)n
i∑
k=0
(−1)i−k
(
i
k
)
nkEi+j−k(0)
)
. 
The following two theorems, which follow immediately from Theorem 6.2.3, show
the asymptotic value of the convolution alternating power sum Ti,j(n) as n→∞.
Theorem 6.2.4 For any integers i, j ≥ 0,
lim
n→∞
Ti,j(n)
nmax(i,j)+1
= 0.
Theorem 6.2.5 For any integers j > i ≥ 0,
lim
n→∞
Ti,j(n)
nj
=
1
2
Ei(0).
6.2.2 Some limit theorems
Theorem 6.2.6 For any integers j > i ≥ 0 and any complex number c,
lim
n→∞
1
nj
n∑
k=0
(−1)kki(n− k + c)[j] = 1
2
Ei(0).
Proof. We can write
(n− k + c)[j] = (n− k)j + cj−1(n− k)j−1 + cj−2(n− k)j−2 + · · ·+ c1(n− k) + c0
for some complex numbers cj−1, cj−2, . . . , c1, c0 depending on c. Therefore,
n∑
k=0
(−1)kki(n−k+c)[j] = Ti,j(n)+cj−1Ti,j−1(n)+cj−2Ti,j−2(n)+· · ·+c1Ti,1(n)+c0Ti,0(n).
Since i < j, by Theorem 6.2.4 and Theorem 6.2.5,
lim
n→∞
1
nj
n∑
k=0
(−1)kki(n− k + c)[j] = lim
n→∞
1
nj
Ti,j(n) =
1
2
Ei(0). 
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Theorem 6.2.7 For any integer i ≥ 0 and any complex number c,
lim
n→∞
1
ni+1
n∑
k=1
(−1)k(n− k + c)[i] = 0.
Proof. The statement is clearly true for i = 0. For i > 0, it follows from Theo-
rem 6.2.6. 
Theorem 6.2.8 For any integer i ≥ 0 and any complex number c,
lim
n→∞
1
ni
n∑
k=1
(−1)k
k
(n− k + c)[i] = − ln 2.
Proof. We prove the result by induction on i. With i = 0, it is a well-known identity:
∞∑
k=1
(−1)k
k
= − ln 2.
Assuming the hypothesis for i, we are proving the i+ 1 case. We have
n∑
k=1
(−1)k
k
(n− k + c)[i+1] =
n∑
k=1
(−1)k
k
(n− k + c)(n− k + c+ 1)[i]
= (n+ c)
n∑
k=1
(−1)k
k
(n− k + c+ 1)[i] −
n∑
k=1
(−1)k(n− k + c+ 1)[i],
so
lim
n→∞
1
ni+1
n∑
k=1
(−1)k
k
(n− k + c)[i+1]
= lim
n→∞
n+ c
n
1
ni
n∑
k=1
(−1)k
k
(n− k + c+ 1)[i] − lim
n→∞
1
ni+1
n∑
k=1
(−1)k(n− k + c+ 1)[i]
= − ln 2− 0
by the induction hypothesis for i and by Theorem 6.2.7. 
Theorem 6.2.9 For any integers 0 ≤ α ≤ β, any integer `, and any complex
numbers c, d,
lim
n→∞
1
nβ
n+∑̀
k=1
(−1)k (k + c)
[α](n− k + d)[β]
k
= −c[α] ln 2+(−1)
α
2
α∑
j=1
j∑
i=1
s1(α, j)(−c)j−iEi−1(−c).
In particular, the limit is independent of d.
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Proof. Note that when |k − n| ≤ |`|, the summands
(−1)k (k + c)
[α](n− k + d)[β]
k
= O(nα−1),
so we can ignore these summands when we calculate the limit.
Using (6.2), we have
(k + c)[α] =
α∑
j=0
[
α
j
]
(k + c)j =
α∑
j=0
[
α
j
] j∑
i=0
(
j
i
)
cj−iki
=
α∑
j=0
[
α
j
]
cj +
α∑
j=1
[
α
j
] j∑
i=1
(
j
i
)
cj−iki
= c[α] +
α∑
j=1
[
α
j
] j∑
i=1
(
j
i
)
cj−iki.
Therefore,
n∑
k=1
(−1)k (k + c)
[α](n− k + d)[β]
k
= c[α]
n∑
k=1
(−1)k (n− k + d)
[β]
k
+
α∑
j=1
[
α
j
] j∑
i=1
(
j
i
)
cj−i
n∑
k=1
(−1)kki−1(n− k + d)[β].
We want to use Theorem 6.2.6, so in the second summation, we need to change the
range of k from 0 to n as
n∑
k=1
(−1)k (k + c)
[α](n− k + d)[β]
k
= c[α]
n∑
k=1
(−1)k (n− k + d)
[β]
k
+
α∑
j=1
[
α
j
] j∑
i=1
(
j
i
)
cj−i
n∑
k=0
(−1)kki−1(n− k + d)[β] −
α∑
j=1
[
α
j
]
jcj−1(n+ d)[β].
By Theorem 6.2.6 and Theorem 6.2.8, we have
lim
n→∞
1
nβ
n∑
k=1
(−1)k (k + c)
[α](n− k + d)[β]
k
= −c[α] ln 2+1
2
α∑
j=1
[
α
j
] j∑
i=1
(
j
i
)
cj−iEi−1(0)−
α∑
j=1
[
α
j
]
jcj−1.
By Lemma 6.1.3,
lim
n→∞
1
nβ
n∑
k=1
(−1)k (k + c)
[α](n− k + d)[β]
k
= −c[α] ln 2+1
2
α∑
j=1
[
α
j
] j∑
i=1
cj−iEi−1(c)−
α∑
j=1
[
α
j
]
jcj−1.
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By Lemma 6.1.2,
lim
n→∞
1
nβ
n∑
k=1
(−1)k (k + c)
[α](n− k + d)[β]
k
= −c[α] ln 2+1
2
α∑
j=1
[
α
j
] j∑
i=1
(−1)icj−iEi−1(−c).
Using (6.4), we have
lim
n→∞
1
nβ
n∑
k=1
(−1)k (k + c)
[α](n− k + d)[β]
k
= −c[α] ln 2 + 1
2
α∑
j=1
(−1)α+js1(α, j)
j∑
i=1
(−1)icj−iEi−1(−c)
= −c[α] ln 2 + (−1)
α
2
α∑
j=1
s1(α, j)
j∑
i=1
(−c)j−iEi−1(−c). 
6.3 Euler polynomials and Stirling numbers
The main result of this section, Theorem 6.3.1, is an identity involving Euler poly-
nomials and Stirling numbers. We derive this identity by using Stirling transforms
of sequences. In Theorem 6.6.1, we will use the identity to simplify the value of the
harmonic continued fraction.
First, we prove the following two auxiliary lemmas.
Lemma 6.3.1 Let
Ua(x) = 2(x+ 2)
a ln
2(x+ 1)
x+ 2
;
then
U (a−1)a (0) = 4a!
(
1− 1
2
+
1
3
− 1
4
+ · · · − 1
2ba
2
c
)
.
Proof. By the Leibniz differentiation formula,
U (a−1)a (x) = 2 ((x+ 2)
a)
(a−1)
ln
2(x+ 1)
x+ 2
+ 2
a−1∑
i=1
(
a− 1
i
)
((x+ 2)a)
(a−1−i)
(
ln
2(x+ 1)
x+ 2
)(i)
= 2 ((x+ 2)a)
(a−1)
ln
2(x+ 1)
x+ 2
+ 2
a−1∑
i=1
(
a− 1
i
)(
a!
(i+ 1)!
(x+ 2)i+1
)(
(−1)i−1(i− 1)!((x+ 1)−i − (x+ 2)−i)
)
,
so
U (a−1)a (0) = 2
a−1∑
i=1
(
a− 1
i
)(
a!
(i+ 1)!
2i+1
)(
(−1)i−1(i− 1)!(1− 2−i)
)
= 4a!
a−1∑
i=1
(
a− 1
i
)
(−1)i − (−2)i
i(i+ 1)
.
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If
xa =
a−1∑
i=1
(
a− 1
i
)
(−1)i − (−2)i
i(i+ 1)
then it suffices to prove that
xa = 1−
1
2
+
1
3
− 1
4
+ · · · − 1
2ba
2
c
.
Indeed, we have
xa+1 − xa =
(−1)a − (−2)a
a(a+ 1)
+
a−1∑
i=1
((
a
i
)
−
(
a− 1
i
))
(−1)i − (−2)i
i(i+ 1)
=
(−1)a − (−2)a
a(a+ 1)
+
a−1∑
i=1
(
a− 1
i− 1
)
(−1)i − (−2)i
i(i+ 1)
=
a∑
i=1
(
a− 1
i− 1
)
(−1)i − (−2)i
i(i+ 1)
=
1
a(a+ 1)
a∑
i=1
(
a+ 1
i+ 1
)
((−1)i − (−2)i)
=
1
a(a+ 1)
(
−
a∑
i=1
(
a+ 1
i+ 1
)
(−1)i+1 + 1
2
a∑
i=1
(
a+ 1
i+ 1
)
(−2)i+1
)
=
1
a(a+ 1)
(
−
(
a+
a∑
i=−1
(
a+ 1
i+ 1
)
(−1)i+1
)
+
1
2
(
2a+ 1 +
a∑
i=−1
(
a+ 1
i+ 1
)
(−2)i+1
))
=
1
a(a+ 1)
(
−a+ 1
2
(
2a+ 1 + (−1)a+1
))
=
1 + (−1)a+1
2a(a+ 1)
so
xa+1 − xa =
0 if a is even1
a
− 1
a+1
if a is odd
.
Since x0 = x1 = 0, we have
xa = 1−
1
2
+
1
3
− 1
4
+ · · · − 1
2ba
2
c
. 
Lemma 6.3.2 Let
Wa(x) = 2(e
x + 1)a ln
2ex
ex + 1
;
then
W (j)a (0) =
a∑
α=0
j∑
i=1
(
a
α
)(
j
i
)
αj−iEi−1(0).
Proof. Using (6.5), we have
2
ex + 1
=
∞∑
i=0
Ei(0)
i!
xi.
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Integrating both sides we have
∞∑
i=1
Ei−1(0)
i!
xi =
∫
x
2
ex + 1
= 2(x− ln(ex + 1)) + C.
Making both sides of the above equation equal at x = 0, we have
∞∑
i=1
Ei−1(0)
i!
xi = 2(x− ln(ex + 1) + ln 2) = 2 ln 2e
x
ex + 1
.
On the other hand, we have
(ex + 1)a =
a∑
α=0
(
a
α
)
eαx =
a∑
α=0
(
a
α
) ∞∑
i=0
(αx)i
i!
=
∞∑
i=0
(
a∑
α=0
(
a
α
)
αi
i!
)
xi,
so
Wa(x) = 2(e
x + 1)a ln
2ex
ex + 1
=
∞∑
i=1
Ei−1(0)
i!
xi ×
∞∑
i=0
(
a∑
α=0
(
a
α
)
αi
i!
)
xi.
Considering the coefficient of xj of the above series we have
W
(j)
a (0)
j!
=
j∑
i=1
Ei−1(0)
i!
a∑
α=0
(
a
α
)
αj−i
(j − i)!
,
therefore,
W (j)a (0) =
a∑
α=0
j∑
i=1
(
a
α
)(
j
i
)
αj−iEi−1(0). 
The Stirling transform of a sequence {un}n≥1 of numbers is the sequence {wn}n≥1
given by
wn =
n∑
j=1
s2(n, j)uj.
The inverse transform is
un =
n∑
j=1
s1(n, j)wj.
If
U(x) =
∞∑
n=1
un
n!
xn
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is a formal power series, and
W (x) =
∞∑
n=1
wn
n!
xn
with un and wn as above, then
W (x) = U(ex − 1).
We can now prove the identity referred to above.
Theorem 6.3.1
a−1∑
j=1
a∑
α=0
j∑
i=1
s1(a− 1, j)
(
a
α
)(
j
i
)
αj−iEi−1(0) = 4a!
(
1− 1
2
+
1
3
− 1
4
+ · · · − 1
2ba
2
c
)
.
Proof. Let
Ua(x) = 2(x+ 2)
a ln
2(x+ 1)
x+ 2
,
Wa(x) = 2(e
x + 1)a ln
2ex
ex + 1
;
then
Ua(0) = Wa(0) = 0 and Wa(x) = Ua(e
x − 1).
Hence, the Stirling transform of the sequence {U (n)a (0)}n≥1 is the sequence {W (n)a (0)}n≥1.
It follows that
U (n)a (0) =
n∑
j=1
s1(n, j)W
(j)
a (0).
In particular, when n = a− 1, we have
U (a−1)a (0) =
a−1∑
j=1
s1(a− 1, j)W (j)a (0).
This is the desired identity as in Lemma 6.3.1 it is shown that
U (a−1)a (0) = 4a!
(
1− 1
2
+
1
3
− 1
4
+ · · · − 1
2ba
2
c
)
and in Lemma 6.3.2 it is shown that
W (j)a (0) =
a∑
α=0
j∑
i=1
(
a
α
)(
j
i
)
αj−iEi−1(0). 
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6.4 Closed form formula for the convergent: the
general case t ∈ R+
In this section, we consider the harmonic continued fraction HCF (t) where t > 0
is a fixed and arbitrary real number. The main results, Theorem 6.4.2 and Theo-
rem 6.4.3, give us the closed form formulas for the numerator and the denominator
of the convergents.
Theorem 6.4.1 Let
P (x) =
∞∑
n=0
pn−1x
n,
Q(x) =
∞∑
n=0
qn−1x
n.
Then
P (x) = (1 + x)
t
2
−1(1− x)−
t
2
−1,
Q(x) = (1 + x)
t
2
−1(1− x)−
t
2
−1
∫ x
0
(1− u)
t
2 (1 + u)−
t
2du.
Proof. In this proof, P (x) and Q(x) are considered as formal power series [32] and
their integration and derivative are well-defined. From the Euler-Wallis recurrence
formula
pn =
t
n+ 1
pn−1 + pn−2,∀n ≥ 0,
we have
∞∑
n=0
pnx
n+1 = t
∞∑
n=0
pn−1
xn+1
n+ 1
+
∞∑
n=0
pn−2x
n+1.
Therefore, for some constant C, we have
P (x)− p−1 = t
(∫
P (x)dx+ C
)
+
(
p−2x+ x
2P (x)
)
.
Taking derivatives, we have
P ′(x) = tP (x) + p−2 + x
2P ′(x) + 2xP (x)
and we obtain the following first-order ODE
P ′(x)− 2x+ t
1− x2
P (x) = p−2
1
1− x2
.
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The integrating factor of this ODE is
e
∫
− 2x+t
1−x2
dx
= e
∫ ( −2x
1−x2
− t
2(
1
1+x
+ 1
1−x)
)
dx
= eln(1−x
2)+ t
2
(ln(1−x)−ln(1+x)) = (1−x)
t
2
+1(1+x)−
t
2
+1.
Hence,
d
dx
(
(1− x)
t
2
+1(1 + x)−
t
2
+1P (x)
)
= p−2(1− x)
t
2 (1 + x)−
t
2
and
(1− x)
t
2
+1(1 + x)−
t
2
+1P (x) = p−2
∫
(1− x)
t
2 (1 + x)−
t
2dx+ C.
Since p−2 = 0 and P (0) = p−1 = 1, we have
(1− x)
t
2
+1(1 + x)−
t
2
+1P (x) = 1.
Therefore,
P (x) = (1 + x)
t
2
−1(1− x)−
t
2
−1.
Similarly,
(1− x)
t
2
+1(1 + x)−
t
2
+1Q(x) = q−2
∫
(1− x)
t
2 (1 + x)−
t
2dx+ C.
Since Q(0) = q−1 = 0 and q−2 = 1,
(1− x)
t
2
+1(1 + x)−
t
2
+1Q(x) =
∫ x
0
(1− u)
t
2 (1 + u)−
t
2du,
and we obtain
Q(x) = (1 + x)
t
2
−1(1− x)−
t
2
−1
∫ x
0
(1− u)
t
2 (1 + u)−
t
2du. 
Now apply above to find formulas for pn and qn.
Theorem 6.4.2
pn =
1
(n+ 1)!
n+1∑
k=0
(
n+ 1
k
)(
t
2
− 1
)
[k]
(
t
2
+ 1
)[n+1−k]
.
Proof. By Theorem 6.4.1,
P (x) = (1 + x)
t
2
−1(1− x)−
t
2
−1,
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so by the Leibniz differentiation formula,
P (n)(x) =
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)(
(1 + x)
t
2
−1
)(k) (
(1− x)−
t
2
−1
)(n−k)
=
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)(
t
2
− 1
)
[k]
(1 + x)
t
2
−1−k
(
− t
2
− 1
)
[n−k]
(−1)n−k(1− x)−
t
2
−1−(n−k)
=
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)(
t
2
− 1
)
[k]
(1 + x)
t
2
−1−k
(
t
2
+ 1
)[n−k]
(1− x)−
t
2
−1−(n−k)
and
P (n)(0) =
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)(
t
2
− 1
)
[k]
(
t
2
+ 1
)[n−k]
. (6.9)
Therefore,
pn−1 =
1
n!
P (n)(0) =
1
n!
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)(
t
2
− 1
)
[k]
(
t
2
+ 1
)[n−k]
. 
Theorem 6.4.3
qn =
1
(n+ 1)!
n∑
k=0
k∑
u=0
n−k∑
v=0
(−1)k
(
n+ 1
k + 1
)(
k
u
)(
n− k
v
)(
t
2
)
[u]
(
t
2
)[k−u](
t
2
− 1
)
[v]
(
t
2
+ 1
)[n−k−v]
.
Proof. By Theorem 6.4.1,
Q(x) = (1 + x)
t
2
−1(1− x)−
t
2
−1
∫ x
0
(1− u)
t
2 (1 + u)−
t
2du = P (x)
∫ x
0
R(u)du (6.10)
where
R(x) = (1− x)
t
2 (1 + x)−
t
2 .
By the Leibniz differentiation formula,
Q(n+1)(x) = P (n+1)(x)
∫ x
0
R(u)du+
n∑
k=0
(
n+ 1
k + 1
)
P (n−k)(x)R(k)(x),
so
Q(n+1)(0) =
n∑
k=0
(
n+ 1
k + 1
)
P (n−k)(0)R(k)(0). (6.11)
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Using the Leibniz differentiation formula for R(x), we have
R(k)(x) =
k∑
u=0
(
k
u
)(
(1− x)
t
2
)(u) (
(1 + x)−
t
2
)(k−u)
=
k∑
u=0
(
k
u
)
(−1)u
(
t
2
)
[u]
(1− x)
t
2
−u
(
− t
2
)
[k−u]
(1 + x)−
t
2
−(k−u)
= (−1)k
k∑
u=0
(
k
u
)(
t
2
)
[u]
(
t
2
)[k−u]
(1− x)
t
2
−u(1 + x)−
t
2
−(k−u),
so
R(k)(0) = (−1)k
k∑
u=0
(
k
u
)(
t
2
)
[u]
(
t
2
)[k−u]
. (6.12)
Now, by (6.9), we have
P (n−k)(0) =
n−k∑
v=0
(
n− k
v
)(
t
2
− 1
)
[v]
(
t
2
+ 1
)[n−k−v]
. (6.13)
So substituting (6.12) and (6.13) into (6.11), we have
Q(n+1)(0) =
n∑
k=0
(
n+ 1
k + 1
)(n−k∑
v=0
(
n− k
v
)(
t
2
− 1
)
[v]
(
t
2
+ 1
)[n−k−v])(
(−1)k
k∑
u=0
(
k
u
)(
t
2
)
[u]
(
t
2
)[k−u])
and the theorem follows from the fact that Q(n+1)(0) = (n+ 1)! qn. 
6.5 Closed form formula for the convergent: the
even case t ∈ 2Z+
Throughout this section, t is assumed to be a positive even integer and t = 2a. We
find simplified expressions for pn and qn.
Theorem 6.5.1 When t = 2a,
pn =
1
a!
a−1∑
k=0
(
a− 1
k
)
(n− k + 2)[a].
Proof. By Theorem 6.4.2,
pn =
1
(n+ 1)!
n+1∑
k=0
(
n+ 1
k
)
(a− 1)[k] (a+ 1)
[n+1−k].
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Since the summand in the above sum is zero when k ≥ a, it follows that,
pn =
1
(n+ 1)!
a−1∑
k=0
(
n+ 1
k
)
(a− 1)[k](a+ 1)[n+1−k]
=
1
(n+ 1)!
a−1∑
k=0
(n+ 1)!
k!(n+ 1− k)!
(a− 1)!
(a− 1− k)!
(a+ 1 + n− k)!
a!
=
1
a!
a−1∑
k=0
(a− 1)!
k!(a− 1− k)!
(a+ 1 + n− k)!
(n+ 1− k)!
=
1
a!
a−1∑
k=0
(
a− 1
k
)
(n− k + 2)[a]. 
Theorem 6.5.2 When t = 2a,
qn = −
1
a! (a− 1)!
n+1∑
k=1
min(k−1,a)∑
u=0
a−1∑
v=0
(
a
u
)(
a− 1
v
)
(−1)k
k
(k−u)[a−1](n−k−v+2)[a].
Proof. By Theorem 6.4.3, we have
qn =
n∑
k=0
k∑
u=0
n−k∑
v=0
µ(n, k, u, v),
where
µ(n, k, u, v) =
(−1)k
(n+ 1)!
(
n+ 1
k + 1
)(
k
u
)(
n− k
v
)
a[u]a
[k−u](a− 1)[v](a+ 1)[n−k−v].
Since µ(n, k, u, v) = 0 when u ≥ a+ 1 and when v ≥ a, we have
qn =
n∑
k=0
min(k,a)∑
u=0
min(n−k,a−1)∑
v=0
µ(n, k, u, v).
With u ≤ min(k, a) and v ≤ min(n− k, a− 1), we have
µ(n, k, u, v)
=
(−1)k
(k + 1)!(n− k)!
k!
(k − u)!u!
(n− k)!
(n− k − v)!v!
a!
(a− u)!
(a− 1 + k − u)!
(a− 1)!
(a− 1)!
(a− 1− v)!
(a+ n− k − v)!
a!
=
(−1)k
k + 1
1
u!(a− u)!v!(a− 1− v)!
(a− 1 + k − u)!
(k − u)!
(a+ n− k − v)!
(n− k − v)!
=
(−1)k
k + 1
(k − u+ 1)[a−1](n− k − v + 1)[a]
u!(a− u)!v!(a− 1− v)!
.
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Since (n− k − v + 1)[a] = 0 when n− k < v ≤ a− 1, we have
qn =
n∑
k=0
min(k,a)∑
u=0
a−1∑
v=0
(−1)k
k + 1
(k − u+ 1)[a−1](n− k − v + 1)[a]
u!(a− u)!v!(a− 1− v)!
=
n+1∑
k=1
min(k−1,a)∑
u=0
a−1∑
v=0
(−1)k−1
k
(k − u)[a−1](n− k − v + 2)[a]
u!(a− u)!v!(a− 1− v)!
= − 1
a! (a− 1)!
n+1∑
k=1
min(k−1,a)∑
u=0
a−1∑
v=0
(
a
u
)(
a− 1
v
)
(−1)k
k
(k − u)[a−1](n− k − v + 2)[a]. 
The following theorem is useful later to find the limit value for HCF (t).
Theorem 6.5.3 When t = 2a, let
An =
n+1∑
k=1
a∑
u=0
a−1∑
v=0
(
a
u
)(
a− 1
v
)
(−1)k
k
(k − u)[a−1](n− k − v + 2)[a];
then
qn = (−1)apn−1 −
An
a! (a− 1)!
.
Proof. By Theorem 6.5.2, we have
qn = −
1
a! (a− 1)!
n+1∑
k=1
min(k−1,a)∑
u=0
a−1∑
v=0
(
a
u
)(
a− 1
v
)
(−1)k
k
(k − u)[a−1](n− k − v + 2)[a]
= − 1
a! (a− 1)!
n+1∑
k=1
a∑
u=0
a−1∑
v=0
(
a
u
)(
a− 1
v
)
(−1)k
k
(k − u)[a−1](n− k − v + 2)[a]
+
1
a! (a− 1)!
a+1∑
k=1
a∑
u=k
a−1∑
v=0
(
a
u
)(
a− 1
v
)
(−1)k
k
(k − u)[a−1](n− k − v + 2)[a],
so
qn =
1
a! (a− 1)!
(−An + αn),
where
αn =
a+1∑
k=1
a∑
u=k
a−1∑
v=0
(
a
u
)(
a− 1
v
)
(−1)k
k
(k − u)[a−1](n− k − v + 2)[a].
When 1 ≤ k ≤ a + 1 and k ≤ u ≤ a, (k − u)[a−1] is zero except for the case k = 1
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and u = a, therefore,
αn = −
a−1∑
v=0
(
a− 1
v
)
(1−a)[a−1](n+1−v)[a] = (−1)a(a−1)!
a−1∑
v=0
(
a− 1
v
)
(n+1−v)[a].
By Theorem 6.5.1,
αn = (−1)a (a− 1)! a! pn−1.
Therefore,
qn = (−1)apn−1 −
An
a! (a− 1)!
. 
Theorem 6.5.4 When t = 2a,
lim
n→∞
pn
na
=
2a−1
a!
.
Proof. By Theorem 6.5.1,
lim
n→∞
pn
na
=
1
a!
a−1∑
k=0
(
a− 1
k
)
lim
n→∞
(n− k + 2)[a]
na
=
1
a!
a−1∑
k=0
(
a− 1
k
)
=
2a−1
a!
. 
Theorem 6.5.5 When t = 2a,
lim
n→∞
qn
na
= (−1)a2
a−1
a!
(
1− 2a ln 2 + 1
2 (a− 1)!
a∑
u=0
a−1∑
j=1
j∑
i=1
(
a
u
)
s1(a− 1, j)uj−iEi−1(u)
)
.
Proof. We have
lim
n→∞
An
na
=
a∑
u=0
a−1∑
v=0
(
a
u
)(
a− 1
v
)
A(u, v),
where
A(u, v) = lim
n→∞
1
na
n+1∑
k=1
(−1)k
k
(k − u)[a−1](n− k − v + 2)[a].
By Theorem 6.2.9, A(u, v) is independent of v, as
A(u, v) = −(−u)[a−1] ln 2 + (−1)
a−1
2
a−1∑
j=1
j∑
i=1
s1(a− 1, j)uj−iEi−1(u) = A(u).
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Therefore,
lim
n→∞
An
na
= 2a−1
a∑
u=0
(
a
u
)
A(u)
= 2a−1
a∑
u=0
(
a
u
)(
−(−u)[a−1] ln 2 + (−1)
a−1
2
a−1∑
j=1
j∑
i=1
s1(a− 1, j)uj−iEi−1(u)
)
= −2a−1 ln 2
a∑
u=0
(
a
u
)
(−u)[a−1] − (−1)a2a−2
a∑
u=0
a−1∑
j=1
j∑
i=1
(
a
u
)
s1(a− 1, j)uj−iEi−1(u).
By Lemma 6.1.1,
lim
n→∞
An
na
= (−1)a2aa! ln 2− (−1)a2a−2
a∑
u=0
a−1∑
j=1
j∑
i=1
(
a
u
)
s1(a− 1, j)uj−iEi−1(u).
By Theorem 6.5.3,
lim
n→∞
qn
na
= (−1)a lim
n→∞
pn−1
na
− 1
a! (a− 1)!
lim
n→∞
An
na
.
By Theorem 6.5.4,
lim
n→∞
qn
na
= (−1)a 2
a−1
a!
− 1
a! (a− 1)!
(−1)a2aa! ln 2− (−1)a2a−2 a∑
u=0
a−1∑
j=1
j∑
i=1
(
a
u
)
s1(a− 1, j)uj−iEi−1(u)

= (−1)a 2
a−1
a!
1− 2a ln 2 + 1
2 (a− 1)!
a∑
u=0
a−1∑
j=1
j∑
i=1
(
a
u
)
s1(a− 1, j)uj−iEi−1(u)
 . 
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6.6 Main theorem for the even case
Theorem 6.6.1 For any positive integer a,
HCF (2a) =
(−1)a−1
2a ln 2− 1−
1
2 (a− 1)!
a∑
u=0
a−1∑
j=1
j∑
i=1
(
a
u
)
s1(a− 1, j)uj−iEi−1(u)
=
(−1)a−1
2a ln 2− 1−
1
2 (a− 1)!
a∑
u=0
a−1∑
j=1
j∑
i=1
(
a
u
)
s1(a− 1, j)
(
j
i
)
uj−iEi−1(0)
=
(−1)a−1
2a ln 2− 1− 2a
(
1−
1
2
+
1
3
−
1
4
+ · · · −
1
2ba
2
c
).
Proof. The first identity is by Theorem 6.5.4 and Theorem 6.5.5. The second identity
is by Lemma 6.1.3. The third identity is by Theorem 6.3.1. 
Chapter 7
Cryptanalysis of the RSA System
In this chapter, we will present an attack on the RSA cryptosystem. We show
that if the public key and the private key are smaller than a certain bound then it
is possible to efficiently perform the RSA number factorization and determine the
private key using continued fractions.
The RSA is a public-key cryptosystem widely used for secure data transmission.
The acronym RSA is made of the initial letters of the surnames of Ron Rivest, Adi
Shamir, and Leonard Adleman, who first publicly described the algorithm [37] in
1978. When we are surfing on the Internet, if the address bar starts with https://,
it means that we are using a secure protocol and the data transmitted between our
computer and the website’s server are protected probably with the RSA encryption
algorithm.
In general, a cryptosystem consists of two functions, encrypt and decrypt. The
encrypt function uses an encryption key to transform the plaintext – such as our
credit card number – into a scrambled ciphertext. Decryption is simply the inverse of
encryption. The decrypt function uses a decryption key to transform the ciphertext
back to the plaintext.
Cryptosystems are divided into two categories: symmetric and asymmetric. In a
symmetric-key cryptosystem, the encryption key and the decryption key are the
same, and the two parties in the communication need to agree on the key they are
using. A typical example would be when agent James Bond of the British Secret
Service MI6, before going out on field trip, would set up a key with his base. He
will use this key to encrypt his messages and send them back to MI6. At the home
base, the same key is used in decryption to read his messages. On the other hand,
an asymmetric-key cryptosystem, also known as a public-key cryptosystem, uses
two different keys, one public key for encryption and one private key for decryption.
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The public key can be shared with everyone, whereas the private key must be kept
secret. A typical example would be, in online banking, when we visit the bank’s
website, and the website sends its certificate which contains its public key to our
computer. We can encrypt our sensitive data using the bank’s public key and only
the bank who has the private key can use it to decrypt our data.
Of course, an asymmetric-key cryptosystem is more convenient than a symmetric-key
cryptosystem, particularly in cyberspace, since the two parties in the communication
do not need to meet up to arrange a secret key. The RSA is the most widely used
asymmetric algorithm on the Internet.
In a public-key cryptosystem, the public key and the private key are mathematically
linked and it should be computationally impossible for anyone to determine the
private key from the public key. This means that the system needs to be based
on some hard computational maths problem. The RSA cryptosystem is based on
the hardness of factorization of big numbers. To generate an RSA key, one would
select two large prime numbers p and q, and multiply them to get a huge number
N = pq. Next, choose two numbers 1 < e, d < (p − 1)(q − 1) such that ed = 1
(mod (p − 1)(q − 1)). The public key is (N, e) and the private key is (p, q, d). A
plaintext 1 < m < N is encrypted as c = me (mod N) and the ciphertext c is
decrypted as m = cd (mod N). The decryption and encryption cancel out each
other thanks to Euler’s theorem [21]:
m(p−1)(q−1) = 1 (mod N).
The security of the RSA is based on the hardness of factorization of big numbers.
Given a huge modulus N in the public key, of order, say, 21000, there is no efficient
algorithm currently available to factor N to find the two primes p and q. Thus,
everyone knows N but no one knows φ(N) = (p− 1)(q− 1) except the owner of the
key. So from the public information (N, e), it would be computationally impossible
for anyone to determine the secret value d = e−1 (mod φ(N)).
The running time of the RSA encryption function depends on how large the public
exponent e is. Whereas, the running time of the decryption function depends on
the size of the private exponent d. In some scenarios, where the device on which the
encryption or decryption taken place has limited computational resources, such as a
credit card or an ATM machine, it is desirable to use relatively small parameters e
or d. However, Wiener [46] showed that, using continued fractions, one can efficiently
recover the secret key d from the public information (N, e) if d < 1
3
N
1
4 (see also [5],
[31]). Exploiting a non-linear equation satisfied by the secret key, Boneh et al. [5]
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presented a lattice-based attack that succeeds in polynomial-time when d < N0.292.
By using the continued fraction technique, Bunder and Tonien [10], [11] showed that
the secret key can be recovered if d2e < 8N
3
2 . So if e ≈ Nα, then this method can
recover the secret key if d < 2
√
2N
3
4
−α
2 and certainly for d < 2
√
2N
1
4 – which is
more than 8 times the Wiener’s bound.
In this chapter, we extend the work of [10], [11]. We improve the bound to
d2e < 8tN
3
2 ,
for an arbitrary parameter t, and the running time of our algorithm is O(t logN).
Our new attack is verified by an experiment with a 1024-bit modulus N and a 301-
bit secret key d, which is out of reach for the previous attacks by Wiener [46] and
Boneh et al [5]. In the following figure, the shaded part shows the area where our
method is better than that of [46] and [5].
Figure 7.1: Using continued fractions, for any fixed value of t ∈ Z+, our method
can determine the secret key (p, q, d) from the public key (N, e) in time complexity
O(t log(N)) if d2e < 8tN
3
2 .
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7.1 The RSA algorithm
RSA is a public-key cryptosystem widely used for secure data transmission.
Key Generation:
• Choose two distinct prime numbers p and q of similar bit lengths.
• Compute N = pq and φ(N) = (p− 1)(q − 1).
• Choose e ∈ (1, φ(N)) such that gcd(e, φ(N)) = 1 and calculate
d = e−1 (mod φ(N)) ∈ (1, φ(N)).
Or equivalently, choose d ∈ (1, φ(N)) such that gcd(d, φ(N)) = 1 and calculate
e = d−1 (mod φ(N)).
• The public key is (N, e). The private key is (p, q, d).
Encrypt function:
• For a message m ∈ (1, N), the ciphertext c is determined as
c = me (mod N) ∈ (1, N).
Decrypt function:
• For a ciphertext c ∈ (1, N), the message m is determined as
m = cd (mod N) ∈ (1, N).
The correctness of the algorithm. Since ed = 1 (mod φ(N)), we have
ed = 1 + kφ(N)
for some k ∈ N, so
cd = (me)d = med = m1+kφ(N) = m · (mφ(N))k = m (mod N)
and thus, the encrypt and decrypt functions cancel out each other.
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Example. For an example, we choose the following two primes using the digits of√
19 and the number π:
p = b105 ×
√
19c = 435889
q = b105 × πc = 314159,
which give the RSA modulus
N = pq = 136938452351.
We choose the public exponent
e = 2017
and derive the private exponent
d = e−1 (mod φ(N)) = 75767216545.
For a message
m = 123456789,
encryption gives
c = me (mod N) = 1234567892017 (mod 136938452351)
= 60322867288.
Decryption of this ciphertext gives back the message
m = cd (mod N) = 6032286728875767216545 (mod 136938452351)
= 123456789.
7.2 The Wiener attack
The complexity of the decrypt function is based on the size of the decryption key d.
In a cryptosystem with a limited resource such as a credit card, it is desirable to
have a smaller value of d. Wiener’s attack uses the continued fraction method to
expose the private key d when d is small (d < 1
3
N
1
4 ).
The following theorem summarises Wiener’s attack [5], [46].
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Theorem 7.2.1 If the following conditions are satisfied
• q < p < 2q
• 0 < e, d < φ(N)
• ed− kφ(N) = 1
• d < 1
3
N
1
4
then k
d
is a convergent of the regular continued fraction of e
N
and there is an algorithm
with time complexity O(log(N)) that can determine the secret information p, q, d, k
from the public key (N, e).
Since e
N
has O(log(N)) number of convergents, Wiener’s algorithm will succeed to
factor N and output p, q, d, k in O(log(N)) time complexity.
The idea behind Wiener’s attack is as follows. From the equation ed− kφ(N) = 1,
we have
e
φ(N)
− k
d
=
1
dφ(N)
is small.
We do not know e
φ(N)
, but we know its approximation
e
φ(N)
≈ e
N
,
so if d is a number such that ∣∣∣∣ eN − kd
∣∣∣∣ < 12d2
then by Theorem 1.4.9, k
d
is a convergent of e
N
. Thus, by calculating the continued
fraction of e
N
we can discover the secret information d.
Example 1. In the following example, we have a 1024-bit modulus N , the up-
per bound 1
3
N
1
4 in Theorem 7.2.1 is 255-bit, d is 255-bit and we have found the
convergent c149 =
p149
q149
= k
d
as asserted by Theorem 7.2.1.
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p 12137
2429807756 5612551149 2629609691 9449141205 8680156593
9661850265 4224438815 0519802020 4979508724 3102230079
9409502534 6163494126 0471531617 7098769594 1320931493 512 bits
q 9201
0524322086 3900671386 8662660639 9738950237 2692456878
2613825773 8431082681 6215281513 7070448098 3908271161
4206768781 4447541784 7243525840 6453897707 3778553491 512 bits
N 111675409
0485730823 5978712392 1718417590 8091542898 6532382066
5485087798 8534958587 2419428390 8818158158 7258671440
7683378413 7900981405 8406611299 6495087782 9075022344
5692173775 8022280271 1775885570 7370037539 5363272503
0411307566 7128393688 9712399229 9533595050 1425299028
6693467091 9270372721 8720248761 5489260235 4246992063 1024 bits
φ(N) 111675409
0485730823 5978712392 1718417590 8091542898 6532382066
5485087798 8534958587 2419428390 8818158158 7258671440
7683378413 7900981405 8406611299 6495087782 9075001006
2738043932 8509057735 0483615238 8181946096 3990659030
8135631527 4472872192 2977315695 7483638227 4414797787
3077195775 8659336811 1005191303 1936592933 9147507080 1024 bits
Theorem 7.2.1 3426637 2625316286 2968546235
bound 13N
1
4 7247145632 3454416288 1157194267 8892540948 5361638977 255 bits
e 45643085
8324017120 3133152071 1529402253 9055348712 7592566099
1853899212 7134329984 8723684744 2845550165 4714497720
7173865355 1358820024 8341016147 1746464324 1362580067
0745402653 2892481331 8307985083 2822164891 3129959216
3726940854 8355291478 1683701096 4254131032 8949699809
7582249761 4243019490 2375579169 7150271910 4226716997 1023 bits
d 3426637 2625316286 2968546235
7247145632 3454416288 1157194267 8892540948 5361638973 255 bits
k 1400507 9544612205 2131699024
5626308122 5492430329 4046240953 0743691100 4314600526 253 bits
convergent of eN found c149 =
p149
q149
= kd
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7.3 The new attack
In this section, we present our new attack which is an improvement over the Wiener
attack.
First, let us review the idea behind Wiener’s attack. Since ed−kφ(N) = 1, we have
e
φ(N)
− k
d
=
1
dφ(N)
is small.
We do not know e
φ(N)
, but we know its approximation
e
φ(N)
≈ e
N
,
so if d is a number such that ∣∣∣∣ eN − kd
∣∣∣∣ < 12d2
then by Theorem 1.4.9, k
d
is a convergent of e
N
. Thus, by calculating the continued
fraction of e
N
we can discover the secret information d.
In our attack, instead of using the convergents of the continued fraction of e
N
as in
the Wiener’s original attack, we will use the convergents of the continued fraction
of e
N ′
where N ′ is a better approximation of φ(N).
We have the following observation. Consider an arbitrary interval (φmin, φmax) and
suppose that φ ∈ (φmin, φmax). If we divide the interval (φmin, φmax) into 2 equal
sub-intervals with the midpoint N1 as in Figure 7.2, then no matter where φ lies on
the interval, we always have
|φ−N1| ≤
φmax − φmin
2
.
Figure 7.2: Divide the interval into 2 equal sub-intervals with midpoint N1.
If we divide the interval (φmin, φmax) into 4 equal sub-intervals as in Figure 7.3 with
N1 = φmin +
φmax − φmin
4
and N2 = φmin + 3
φmax − φmin
4
,
then no matter where φ lies on the interval, we always can find Ni such that
|φ−Ni| ≤
φmax − φmin
4
.
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Figure 7.3: Divide the interval into 4 equal sub-intervals with
N1 = φmin +
φmax−φmin
4 and N2 = φmin + 3
φmax−φmin
4 .
And if we divide the interval (φmin, φmax) into 6 equal sub-intervals as in Figure 7.4
with
N1 = φmin+
φmax − φmin
6
, N2 = φmin+3
φmax − φmin
6
and N3 = φmin+5
φmax − φmin
6
,
then we always can find Ni such that
|φ−Ni| ≤
φmax − φmin
6
.
Figure 7.4: Divide the interval into 6 equal sub-intervals with
N1 = φmin +
φmax−φmin
6 , N2 = φmin + 3
φmax−φmin
6 and N3 = φmin + 5
φmax−φmin
6 .
We have the following general result.
Lemma 7.3.1 Suppose that φ ∈ (φmin, φmax). Let t ∈ N be a fixed positive integer
and define
Ni = φmin + (2i− 1)
φmax − φmin
2t
, 1 ≤ i ≤ t,
then there exists i such that
|φ−Ni| ≤
φmax − φmin
2t
.
This is our main theorem.
Theorem 7.3.1 Let t be a fixed positive integer. In the RSA algorithm, if the
following conditions are satisfied
• q < p < 2q
• 0 < e, d < φ(N)
• ed− kφ(N) = 1
• N > 2000000 t2
• d2e < 8tN
3
2
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and
Ni = N + 1−
3√
2
N
1
2 + (2i− 1)
( 3√
2
− 2)N 12
2t
, 1 ≤ i ≤ t,
then k
d
is a convergent of the regular continued fraction of ebNic for some i ∈ [1, t]
and there is an algorithm with time complexity O(t log(N)) that can determine the
secret information p, q, d, k from the public key (N, e).
Proof. It follows from q < p < 2q that 1 <
√
p
q
<
√
2, so since the function
f(x) = x+ 1
x
is increasing on [1,+∞), we have
2 <
√
p
q
+
√
q
p
<
√
2 +
1√
2
=
3√
2
.
Therefore,
2N
1
2 < p+ q <
3√
2
N
1
2
and
N + 1− 2N
1
2 > φ(N) = N + 1− (p+ q) > N + 1− 3√
2
N
1
2 .
Let
φmin = N + 1−
3√
2
N
1
2 , φmax = N + 1− 2N
1
2 .
then φ(N) ∈ (φmin, φmax). From the definition of Ni, we can see that
Ni = φmin + (2i− 1)
φmax − φmin
2t
,
so by Lemma 7.3.1, there exists Ni such that
|φ(N)−Ni| ≤
φmax − φmin
2t
.
Thus,
|φ(N)− bNic| ≤ |φ(N)−Ni|+ |Ni − bNic| <
φmax − φmin
2t
+ 1.
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We have∣∣∣∣ ebNic − kd
∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣( ebNic − eφ(N)
)
+
(
e
φ(N)
− k
d
)∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣e(φ(N)− bNic)bNicφ(N) + 1dφ(N)
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣e(φ(N)− bNic)bNicφ(N) + eφ(N)(kφ(N) + 1)
∣∣∣∣
≤ e|φ(N)− bNic|
bNicφ(N)
+
e
φ(N)(kφ(N) + 1)
<
e(φmax−φmin
2t
+ 1)
φ2min
+
e
φ2min
=
e(φmax − φmin + 4t)
2tφ2min
<
e(φmax − φmin + 4t)
2t(φmin − 1)2
=
e
2t
( 3√
2
− 2)N 12 + 4t
(N − 3√
2
N
1
2 )2
.
It remains to show that, for N > 2000000 t2,
( 3√
2
− 2)N 12 + 4t
(N − 3√
2
N
1
2 )2
<
1
8N
3
2
(7.1)
and thus, ∣∣∣∣ ebNic − kd
∣∣∣∣ < e
16tN
3
2
<
1
2d2
,
which, by Theorem 1.4.9, implies that k
d
is equal a convergent pn
qn
of the regular
continued fraction of ebNic .
The inequality (7.1) is equivalent to
8N
1
2
((
3√
2
− 2
)
N
1
2 + 4t
)
<
(
N
1
2 − 3√
2
)2
↔ (12
√
2− 16)N + 32tN
1
2 < N − 3
√
2N
1
2 +
9
2
↔ (32t+ 3
√
2)N
1
2 < (17− 12
√
2)N +
9
2
.
It suffices now to show that
(17− 12
√
2)N > (32t+ 3
√
2)N
1
2
which is equivalent to
N
1
2 >
32t+ 3
√
2
17− 12
√
2
= (544 + 384
√
2)t+ 72 + 51
√
2.
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Indeed, we have
(544 + 384
√
2)t+ 72 + 51
√
2 < 1088t+ 145 ≤ 1233t < 1000
√
2t.
So if N > 2000000 t2 then
N
1
2 > 1000
√
2t > (544 + 384
√
2)t+ 72 + 51
√
2
and we obtain the desired inequality (7.1).
Now, since k
d
is equal to a convergent of the regular continued fraction of ebNic , we
need to go through the list of all convergents of ebNic for each 1 ≤ i ≤ t to determine
the secret information p, q, d, k.
Given each convergent cn =
pn
qn
of ebNic , by Theorem 1.4.4, gcd(pn, qn) = 1. The
equation ed − kφ(N) = 1 also implies gcd(k, d) = 1. So if k
d
= pn
qn
then pn = k and
qn = d. Based on the equation ed − kφ(N) = 1, it is easy to check if pn = k and
qn = d or not as follows:
• Check if eqn−1 is divisible by pn or not. If not then the convergent cn = pnqn 6=
k
d
.
• If pn | eqn − 1, let φ(N) = eqn−1pn
• Calculate S = p+ q = N + 1− φ(N)
• Solve the quadratic equation x2 − Sx+N = 0 for p and q and check if p and
q are prime numbers.
Since there are t such numbers ebNic and each of these numbers
e
bNic has O(logN)
convergents, so the algorithm runs with time complexity O(t logN). 
The condition d2e < 8tN
3
2 in our Theorem 7.3.1 implies that if either d or e is
relatively small then the RSA algorithm can be broken. When e is relatively small,
the Wiener [46] attack and the Boneh et al [5] attack cannot be applied, whereas
ours can.
7.4 An experimental result
In this experiment, we use a 1024-bit modulus N . With this 1024-bit modulus, the
Wiener [46] upper bound 1
3
N
1
4 is 255-bit and the Boneh et al [5] upper bound N0.292
is 300-bit. Here, we show an example of a 301-bit secret key d.
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p 15011
2271103733 6565415840 3067757190 6321456869 1431825325
8934337930 4220889387 6648153060 2101252338 5824008783
1777109693 9641425989 8182377183 5489776201 0681443971 513 bits
q 7505
6135551866 8282707920 1533878595 3160728434 5715912662
9467168965 2110444693 8324076530 1050626169 2912004391
5888554846 9820712994 9091188591 7744888100 5340722459 512 bits
N 112668469
6796041526 7971520532 0876473037 7046884372 9760286962
6874267967 3756539269 1189672089 9781722542 1945656382
5759860729 9822848396 6727797775 0084652425 6540519217
4340471539 2411113144 5280699866 6080080254 2666742865
1582206786 8333213968 4817884864 7186204199 6830773388
8265497642 6165255577 8066003793 3742983671 0469844689 1024 bits
e 3546 8275150449 8928214645 4839949072 3541699917
8541053777 8814805556 3065068030 4414979123 8328581104
1893345269 5958651561 5309067787 8603508234 2712088372
4932440491 5675387082 4436150635 7150276983 7219994359
5285085507 4207336971 8472035998 0686363860 0357485766
5921571443 5738043230 0941622668 1348247084 7659063039 976 bits
d 2 0370359763 3448608626 8445688409 3781610614
6839033189 2501272280 8987537625 9952667341 9734643939 301 bits
Theorem 7.3.1
t 160000000000
bN1c 112668469
6796041526 7971520532 0876473037 7046884372 9760286962
6874267967 3756539269 1189672089 9781722542 1945656382
5759860729 9822848396 6727797775 0084652425 6540496700
5933815978 9987895073 8645796041 4302491722 7380075132
4186734235 4363626867 9924887347 9194343965 0319361987
6873850413 4428578030 3533967491 2955055377 7378990296 1024 bits
k 641263 2807160244 6527258322
2705582107 8117668672 2401456947 5530868714 5037898787 252 bits
convergent of eN not found, ci 6=
k
d , ∀i
convergent of ebN1c found c153 =
p153
q153
= kd
This experimental result shows that our usage of continued fractions of ebNic is
essential. If we use continued fractions of e
N
as in Wiener’s original attack then no
convergent ci is found for which ci =
k
d
.
Chapter 8
Cryptanalysis of RSA-variant
Systems
In this chapter, we apply the continued fraction method to launch a new attack
on the three RSA-variant cryptosystems. The first cryptosystem [28], proposed by
Kuwakado, Koyama and Tsuruoka in 1995, is a scheme based on singular cubic
curves y2 = x3 + bx2 (mod N) where N = pq is an RSA modulus. The second
cryptosystem [18], proposed by Elkamchouchi, Elshenawy and Shaban in 2002, is
an extension of the RSA scheme to the field of Gaussian integers using a modulus
N = PQ where P and Q are Gaussian primes such that p = |P | and q = |Q| are
ordinary primes. The third cryptosystem [13], proposed by Castagnos in 2007, is a
scheme over quadratic field quotients with an RSA modulus N = pq based on Lucas
sequences. In the three cryptosystems, the public key e and the private key d are
linked by the equation
ed = 1 (mod (p2 − 1)(q2 − 1)).
By using the continued fraction technique, Bunder, Nitaj, Susilo and Tonien [9]
showed for the first time that the secret key can be recovered if d2e < 2N3 − 18N2.
In this chapter, we extend the work of [9]. We improve the bound to
d2e < 2t
(N2 − 5
2
N)2
N + 4t
≈ 2tN3,
for an arbitrary parameter t, and the running time of our algorithm is O(t logN).
Our new attack is verified by an experiment with a 1024-bit modulus N , a 2029-bit
public key e and a 520-bit private key d.
90
Chapter 8. Cryptanalysis of RSA-variant Systems 91
8.1 The Kuwakado-Koyama-Tsuruoka scheme
The Kuwakado-Koyama-Tsuruoka scheme [28] is a public-key cryptosystem based
on elliptic curves
y2 = x3 + bx2 (mod N)
over a ring ZN where N = pq is an RSA-modulus.
In this cryptosystem, plaintexts and ciphertexts are represented as points P = (x, y)
of the curve and the correctness of the algorithm is based on the equation
(p2 − 1)(q2 − 1)P = ON ,
where ON – the point at infinity – is the additive identity of the curve.
The scheme can be summarised as follows.
Key Generation:
• Choose two distinct prime numbers p and q of similar bit-lengths.
• Compute N = pq.
• Choose e ∈ (1, (p2 − 1)(q2 − 1)) such that gcd(e, (p2 − 1)(q2 − 1)) = 1 and
calculate
d = e−1 (mod (p2 − 1)(q2 − 1)) ∈ (1, (p2 − 1)(q2 − 1)).
• The public key is (N, e). The private key is (p, q, d).
Encrypt function:
• For a plaintext m = (mx,my) ∈ ZN×ZN , the ciphertext c = (cx, cy) ∈ ZN×ZN
is determined as
– Calculate
b =
m2y −m3x
m2x
(mod N),
this makes (mx,my) a point on the curve y
2 = x3 + bx2 (mod N),
– On the curve y2 = x3 + bx2 (mod N), calculate the point
(cx, cy) = e(mx,my).
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Decrypt function:
• For a ciphertext c = (cx, cy) ∈ ZN×ZN , the plaintext m = (mx,my) ∈ ZN×ZN
is determined as
– Calculate
b =
c2y − c3x
c2x
(mod N),
this makes (cx, cy) a point on the curve y
2 = x3 + bx2 (mod N),
– On the curve y2 = x3 + bx2 (mod N), calculate the point
(mx,my) = d(cx, cy).
8.2 The Elkamchouchi-Elshenawy-Shaban scheme
The Elkamchouchi-Elshenawy-Shaban scheme [18] is an extension of the RSA scheme
over the domain of Gaussian integers. A Gaussian integer is a complex number of
the form a + bi where a, b ∈ Z. The set of all Gaussian integers is the ring Z[i].
The norm of a Gaussian integer a + bi is |a + bi| = a2 + b2. A Gaussian prime is
a Gaussian integer which is divisible only by a unit. The units in Z[i] are ±1 and
±i and have norm 1. If a2 + b2 is a prime number in Z, then a + ib is a Gaussian
prime. And if p ∈ Z is an ordinary prime number, then Gaussian integers p and pi
are Gaussian primes if and only if p ≡ 3 (mod 4).
If P and Q are Gaussian primes and N = PQ, then for any Gaussian integer α 6= 0
(mod N), we have
α(|P |−1)(|Q|−1) = 1 (mod N). (8.1)
In the Elkamchouchi-Elshenawy-Shaban scheme, we use two large integers p and q
which are Gaussian primes. So in this case, the equation (8.1) becomes
α(p
2−1)(q2−1) = 1 (mod N).
The scheme can be summarised as follows.
Key Generation:
• Choose two distinct prime numbers p and q of similar bit-lengths which are
Gaussian primes.
• Compute N = pq.
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• Choose e ∈ (1, (p2 − 1)(q2 − 1)) such that gcd(e, (p2 − 1)(q2 − 1)) = 1 and
calculate
d = e−1 (mod (p2 − 1)(q2 − 1)) ∈ (1, (p2 − 1)(q2 − 1)).
• The public key is (N, e). The private key is (p, q, d).
Encrypt function:
• For a plaintext m ∈ Z[i], the ciphertext c ∈ Z[i] is determined as
c = me (mod N).
Decrypt function:
• For a ciphertext c ∈ Z[i], the plaintext m ∈ Z[i] is determined as
m = cd (mod N)
8.3 The Castagnos scheme
The Castagnos scheme [13] is a public-key cryptosystem based on certain Lucas
sequences. Let r be an integer. Define the sequence as follows
V0(r) = 2, V1(r) = r, Vk+2(r) = rVk+1(r)− Vk(r).
The scheme can be summarised as follows.
Key Generation:
• Choose two distinct prime numbers p and q of similar bit-lengths.
• Compute N = pq.
• Choose e ∈ (1, (p2 − 1)(q2 − 1)) such that gcd(e, (p2 − 1)(q2 − 1)) = 1 and
calculate
d = e−1 (mod (p2 − 1)(q2 − 1)) ∈ (1, (p2 − 1)(q2 − 1)).
• The public key is (N, e). The private key is (p, q, d).
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Encrypt function:
• For a plaintext m ∈ ZN , the ciphertext c ∈ ZN2 is determined as
– Choose a random integer r ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N − 1} \ {2, N − 2}.
– Calculate
c = (1 +mN)Ve(r) (mod N
2).
Decrypt function:
• Precomputation:
d(p,1) = e
−1 (mod (p− 1))
d(p,−1) = e
−1 (mod (p+ 1))
d(q,1) = e
−1 (mod (q − 1))
d(q,−1) = e
−1 (mod (q + 1))
invq = p
−1 (mod q)
invp = q
−1 (mod p)
• For a ciphertext c ∈ ZN2 , the plaintext m ∈ ZN is determined as
– Calculate
ip = (
c2 − 4
p
), here (
x
y
) denotes the Legendre symbol
rp = Vd(p,ip)(c) (mod p)
iq = (
c2 − 4
q
)
rq = Vd(q,iq)(c) (mod q)
r = rp + p(rq − rp)invq (mod N)
tp = c/Ve(r) mod p
2
sp = (tp − 1)/p
mp = sp × invp (mod p)
tq = c/Ve(r) mod q
2
sq = (tq − 1)/q
mq = sq × invq (mod q)
m = mp + p(mq −mp)invq (mod N).
The interested reader is referred to [13] for the correctness proof of the algorithm.
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8.4 The new attack
In the three RSA-variant schemes considered in this chapter, the public key e and
the private key d satisfy the equation
ed = 1 (mod (p2 − 1)(q2 − 1)).
We now present our attack on the three schemes based on the continued fraction
technique.
Theorem 8.4.1 Let t be a fixed positive integer. If the following conditions are
satisfied
• q < p < 2q
• 0 < e, d < (p2 − 1)(q2 − 1)
• ed− k(p2 − 1)(q2 − 1) = 1
• d2e < 2t
(N2 − 5
2
N)2
N + 4t
≈ 2tN3
and
Ni = N
2 + 1− 5
2
N + (2i− 1)N
4t
, 1 ≤ i ≤ t,
then k
d
is a convergent of the regular continued fraction of e
Ni
for some i ∈ [1, t] and
there is an algorithm with time complexity O(t log(N)) that can determine the secret
information p, q, d, k from the public key (N, e).
Proof. It follows from q < p < 2q that 1 < p
q
< 2, so since the function f(x) = x+ 1
x
is increasing on [1,+∞), we have
2 <
p
q
+
q
p
< 2 +
1
2
=
5
2
.
Therefore,
2N < p2 + q2 <
5
2
N
and
N2 + 1− 2N > (p2 − 1)(q2 − 1) > N2 + 1− 5
2
N.
Let
φmin = N
2 + 1− 5
2
N, φmax = N
2 + 1− 2N and φ = (p2 − 1)(q2 − 1)
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then φ ∈ (φmin, φmax). From the definition of Ni, we can see that
Ni = φmin + (2i− 1)
φmax − φmin
2t
,
so by Lemma 7.3.1, there exists Ni such that
|φ−Ni| ≤
φmax − φmin
2t
.
We have∣∣∣∣ eNi − kd
∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣( eNi − eφ
)
+
(
e
φ
− k
d
)∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣e(φ−Ni)Niφ + 1dφ
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣e(φ−Ni)Niφ + eφ(kφ+ 1)
∣∣∣∣
≤ e|φ−Ni|
Niφ
+
e
φ(kφ+ 1)
≤
eφmax−φmin
2t
φ2min
+
e
φ2min
=
e(φmax − φmin + 2t)
2tφ2min
<
e(φmax − φmin + 2t)
2t(φmin − 1)2
=
e
2t
1
2
N + 2t
(N2 − 5
2
N)2
=
e
4t
N + 4t
(N2 − 5
2
N)2
<
1
2d2
.
Thus, by Theorem 1.4.9, k
d
is equal to a convergent of the regular continued fraction
of e
Ni
. So we need to go through the list of all convergents of e
Ni
for each 1 ≤ i ≤ t
to determine the secret information p, q, d, k.
Given each convergent cn =
pn
qn
of e
Ni
, by Theorem 1.4.4, gcd(pn, qn) = 1. The
equation ed − kφ = 1 also implies gcd(k, d) = 1. So if k
d
= pn
qn
then pn = k and
qn = d. Based on the equation ed− kφ = 1, it is easy to check if pn = k and qn = d
or not as follows:
• Check if eqn−1 is divisible by pn or not. If not then the convergent cn = pnqn 6=
k
d
.
• If so, calculate φ = eqn−1
pn
• Calculate S = p2 + q2 = N2 + 1− φ
• Solving the quadratic equation x2−Sx+N2 = 0 for x1,2 = p2, q2 and check if
√
x1 and
√
x2 are prime numbers.
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Since there are t such numbers e
Ni
and each of these numbers e
Ni
has O(logN)
convergents, so the algorithm runs with time complexity O(t logN). 
8.5 An experimental result
We consider two RSA primes p and q, both of 512 bits, which give us a 1024-bit
modulus N . The public exponent e is 2029-bit and the secret exponent d is 520-bit.
p =1009926345 7471330007 1984329453 1837129144 5329854502
1579205949 1972427206 6832404994 0387919056 4150845276
8065924106 7922890816 2666245720 1616730699 1117239731 85481
q =9201052432 2086390067 1386866266 0639973895 0237269245
6878261382 5773843108 2681621528 1513707044 8098390827
1161420676 8781444754 1784724352 5840645389 7707377855 3491
N =9292385259 8882409829 3162082225 5290648240 2932610895
2796745930 4569281602 2535261774 6000624542 0686015350
5820019086 9644402726 0931963319 2462241182 6579351302
0782053736 0725528276 5503973157 0642939798 0805113181
1631153462 5580255681 0453116780 9138251914 8143650220
1487534725 1944638440 3016589748 5133626528 3338290596 23064171
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e =5610945328 2671796041 5829077437 9519142056 5955456458
7016831195 6891736518 8405496534 0274145492 4223492328
5533946739 3132613402 2802793166 8707714667 2017196874
2057028761 3007844191 6424007923 8588782842 5888389498
2399842002 8312226377 0538147674 6869931106 0864836776
4239757895 9256035850 8693271128 6691302868 6894236736
3858899449 4578621026 8249617044 5653141105 6506148300
2531330952 9779988125 0306197976 3903833872 8515848925
1679290735 1472231296 9415530850 4617614777 4425005468
7389111903 1488774848 5654348435 7158394635 1774298241
7614264452 0801690300 4327479471 1402065512 8418504644
3456306876 4694318782 5003370247 1823625867 3480338561 6726117398 7
We use t = 1 and found k
d
at the 306th convergent of e
N1
= e
N2− 9
4
N+1
k =2230382597 4699469998 8596682209 1052908389 5670986870
3180114419 9709650127 6686575639 3075936836 3045074562
2035858758 0823897378 9584493028 0368787713 7164782033 05
d =3432398830 0653048574 9095039954 0696608634 7176500716
5270469723 1729592771 5916988280 2606127982 0330727277
4886481556 9574042901 8560993999 8583219062 8701414555 7262923
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